

EVAWS

Point out the " Way "—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—*The Voice of the Silence.*

THE ARYAN PATH

VOL. V

MARCH 1934

No. 3

THE CHALLENGE OF TOLSTOY

Leo Tolstoy belongs to the very small band of thinkers who regard the tenets of the Sermon on the Mount as not impossible of practice in daily life. Not only did he preach but he lived the Christian life according to his perceptions, thus shedding lustre on Christendom and casting shame on the churches. He was ridiculed and persecuted for this. One more example of how his views and convictions were suppressed is shown by the service which *The New York Times* has rendered in unearthing and publishing Tolstoy's address written in 1909 on the "vile and criminal business" of war. It was prepared by special request, and was read at the Stockholm Peace Conference in August, 1910. "To the peacemakers of that day it seemed to be too extreme in its conclusions. Better, so they thought, that it be not discussed. With due decorum, the document was consigned to the oblivion of the

archives and, in that year, the voice of Tolstoy was silenced by death."

We wish to draw attention to the two forces of Hypocrisy and Fear which permeate and envelop the motives and methods of most "civilized" men and women, a fact which the simple, straightforward and downright words of Tolstoy bring home to every thoughtful man.

Tolstoy throws out a challenge to (1) "all those who form the government" and (2) "the armies consisting of Christians and trained to murder" to declare themselves in favour of—

either Christianity with love for God and for your neighbour, or the State with armies and wars . . . If it is stated that Christianity forbids murder then there will be no army and there will be no government. If it is stated that we, the government, recognize the lawfulness of murder and reject Christianity—no one would want to obey such a government, which bases its power on murder.

His demand for a clear answer to this uncomfortable question is compelling because of its justice: Are you or are you not a Christian? If not, what are you? This was a challenge to hypocrisy, and it can be made to-day as in 1910.

This sin is not confined to the declaration of war and maintenance of peace alone; in every sphere of public life, hypocrisy prevails. A similar challenge if made must perforce remain unanswered by the leaders of "civilization" and their followers—in legislatures, in social circles, in places of worship, in editorial sanctums.

Hypocrisy is called one of the two unpardonable sins in Occultism because it deprives the aspirant of his vision of Reality, however limited. It creates a thick fog which deprives the hypocrite of his own vision. Trying to fool and dupe others, the hypocrite fools and dupes himself. It does not take very long for a sincere and pure-minded man to see through him. The safety of the modern hypocrite lies in the fact that most of the time he has to deal with hypocrites. Diplomats of one country are as befogged as those of another; egotists in one social set encounter egotists in another; Jesuits of the Orient are as astute as the Brahmins of the West; it is such befogged leaders who control the nerves and muscles of humankind. Mental and moral slavery extensively prevails, in spite of universal franchise and free compulsory education.

The remedy? It is implicit in Tolstoy's second assumption. He attacks the fear which obsesses

governments and nations and appeals to them to exorcise that ghost.

. . . just as sometimes a small amount of electric current is sufficient to turn a liquid into a solid body, so it may be that only a small effort—sometimes a single word—is required to lead us from the cruel and unreasonable life of the men of our time, with their divisions, armaments and armies, to a reasonable life, in keeping with the conscious requirements of present-day humanity.

He instances the simple utterance of the child in Andersen's fairy tale who saw the Emperor naked, and said so. "We must say the same; we must say what all know but do not venture to state." The fear which accompanies the herd instinct is intense. People are scared by what others say. The course of action of most men and women is determined not by them but for them. The arbitrary nature of what is "good form" and what is "not done" is hardly questioned. The political party, the social set, the religion and the nation to which a person belongs—these claim his unquestioned loyalty; so unquestioned that they have become veritable fetters of a slavery far more injurious than bodily slavery.

To cast out hypocrisy courage is needed; to cast out fear, perception. To fight the evils of world-wars we need to fight the egotism which begets hypocrisy and the cowardice which begets fear. This necessitates the assumption by men and women of what Emerson calls the "military attitude of the soul".

PSYCHISM: ITS DANGERS AND ITS USES

[Hugh I'A. Fausset, whose recently published autobiography *A Modern Prelude* has been much discussed, is the author of *A Study in Development*, *The Proving of Psyche* and other psychological studies.—EDS.]

The need of the majority of Westerners to-day to recover a spiritual centre is apparent enough. And it is becoming increasingly a felt need. Hence the number of men and women who, distracted by the clamour of a mechanised life, are seeking relief for their jaded nerves in practices commended to them by all sorts of guides, many of whom, whether they be Faith-Healers, Psychoanalysts, or self-acclaimed *Yogis*, lack the real spiritual insight which alone could qualify them for the responsible office which they so lightly assume.

The situation is, indeed, symptomatic of a period in which the old is dying and the new is as yet still struggling to be born. On the one hand we have the organised religions which, despite their deposits of traditional teaching concerning the states of "holy living and holy dying," are too compromised by their dogmas and too jealous of their vested interests to renew their spiritual knowledge by rediscovering its source in the ancient Wisdom-Religion. On the other hand many of the numerous modern religious cults lack altogether that basis of true piety without which the science of the

spiritual life cannot be safely practised or truly known. Nor do they possess, like the churches, any Scriptures or any body of doctrine or philosophy to restrain the excesses of irresponsible individuals. And since the modern world is full of neurotics, it is inevitable that psychism should be in as much demand as psycho-analysis and that many of those who advertise their capacity to meet this demand should be in some degree at least neurotics themselves, even when their motive is apparently disinterested.

Anyone who knows how very potent, both for good and evil, psycho-therapy in all its branches can be, will not belittle the dangers of the situation. Yet it is not by turning away in horror from psychism that these dangers may be eliminated but by learning to distinguish a true science of the inner life from a false. The orthodox Christian attitude to all such practices is, of course, a simple one. Summed up in a few words it is,— "Have nothing to do with them. Go to Church and say your prayers. Live a decent active life; think of others as much as you can and of yourself as little as you can. Trust in God and cultivate a healthy

mind in a healthy body. But as for more interior or self-conscious methods of discipline or of spiritual development, leave them to saints, cranks, and morbid orientals."

Such an attitude may at one time have been adequate for the majority of men and women in the West who were engrossed in the outward practical demands of life and had not yet been disintegrated by forces within and without. But to-day so simple and external a rule of life is insufficient. Madame Blavatsky divined truly enough that a disease of our cycle would be that of Psychism. Yet despite all the dangerous impostures associated with occultism and spiritualism to-day, the growing interest in them is not simply morbid. It is prophetic, surely, of a new kind of consciousness and of communion with the spiritual which is essential to man's development and even survival. It is because man has become imprisoned in a falsely rationalised universe of his own self-centred making that he is greedy for any psychic experience, however trivial or delusive, which seems to transcend the barren categories of thought, of which he is utterly weary. Yet it is only by breaking through these categories and transforming thought into spiritual experience that he can renew the springs of his life. It is a recognition of this necessity which gives force to the findings of the psycho-analysts, even if for the most part they reduce the spiritual to terms of unconscious instinct. But although the interpretation of

the spiritual, advanced by such a psychologist as Jung, is manifestly inadequate, we are in complete agreement with him when he writes that "we moderns are faced with the necessity of rediscovering the life of the spirit; we must experience it anew for ourselves."

This is the one way in which we can break the spell that binds us, not only to the "cycle of biological events," but to the prison of rationalistic thought. The logic of the lower individual mind (*Manas*) must be progressively sacrificed to the insight of the supra-individual Reason (*Buddhi*). Nor can we doubt that this process of growth towards the unity of a creative self-hood can be furthered by certain interior practices of which the virtue and validity have been uncontestedly proved. For it is by inner evolution rather than revolution that most modern men and women may find their true selves. Conversion of the old convulsive kind is, indeed, seldom possible, even if it were desirable, to-day through the very growth of that rational self-consciousness from which man is increasingly pining to be delivered. Delivery, it is true, can only come through a veritable rebirth from the darkness of egoistic error into the light of spiritual truth. But this second birth need not come upon a man suddenly or with sensational violence. And if we examine many past conversions of this violent kind, we shall generally find, not only that they occurred in predominantly simple people, but that while the nature of the individual thus possessed and torn

asunder was permanently changed on a certain level, the change did not affect the more interior levels of his being and may even have arrested the growth of certain finer faculties.

Modern psychology has at least sharpened our sensitiveness to the taint of egoism with which it is itself infected. And in many who have laid claim justly to conversion it is not difficult to detect an ego imperfectly redeemed. Such men have grasped too soon at the satisfaction and the renewed energy which Faith brings with it. And to-day although the disease of doubt has incapacitated so many, it has at least revealed to us how complex, deceptive and deeply-rooted egoism is, and how long and subtle a process of transformation is involved in really eradicating it. It is, for example, because the religious "group" movement, known as "Buchmanism," which advertises its activities most loudly in the West to-day, neglects to study the science of conversion and employs the old crude methods of revivalism, that it is also the most superficial.

Such methods are inadequate today because they reflect an attitude which is behind instead of in front of the consciousness of the age. They evade instead of truly solving the problem of the Promethean intellect and they disregard the more exact knowledge concerning subjective processes which is being acquired both from ancient esoteric and modern psychological sources. For although we cannot share Dr. Jung's belief that analyti-

cal psychology is going of itself to fill "that void which hitherto has marked the psychic insufficiency of Western culture as compared with that of the East," we do agree with him that we have reached a cultural level when we must forgo compulsion, whether emotional or doctrinal, and turn to self-development. For this, as he rightly adds, we must have knowledge of a way or a method. Such a way is not as unknown, as Dr. Jung supposes, nor are the findings and experiences of the psychologist as necessary to provide a foundation for it, as he suggests. Nevertheless both modern psychology and ancient psychism can contribute elements of value to that science of the inner life which it is urgently necessary that Western man should build up and practise.

The fascination, therefore, which psychic life exerts upon modern man is only in its morbid aspect a sign of decadence. It contains, as Dr. Jung remarks, the promise of a far-reaching spiritual change in the Western world, a breaking of the bonds of rationalism, an opening of the creative depths. Therein lies the danger. For in those depths move the forces of destruction as well as of creation. There is security of a kind in the narrow citadel of rationalistic consciousness. The elemental powers of darkness are refused entrance into it, even if the spiritual powers of light are shut out too. But when the sentry or censor is removed and the gates are flung open, strange and terrible monsters may well emerge from the swamps and hidden places of

the unconscious and defy the power of the individual, in whom the old inhibitions have been loosened, to control them. The history of modern psycho-analysis, and more particularly of that associated with the theory and technique of Freud, confirms the truth of this. Admittedly Freud's theory, despite its reduction of spiritual values to terms of sexuality, has proved its relevance as an effectual basis for treatment in certain neurotic cases. But only a man of the deepest imaginative insight could be safely trusted to know when and how to apply it; while, if misapplied, it might well have the most disastrous consequences. And the same applies to the loosening of complexes by other methods of analysis. No one will deny that such disabling knots in the personality should be untied. But to untie them too soon or in the wrong way may well result in a merely superficial adaptation of the individual to life and the arrest or distortion of his real spiritual growth.

And wilful experiments in psychic practices are even more dangerous, perhaps, than experiments in psycho-analysis. Here again we have to do with something of real potential value. The control of the mind or of the breath, the discipline of meditation in its various forms, the fostering of the intuitive faculty and the inner vision are all in some measure necessary to the growth of a new self and a higher consciousness. Yet the temptation to indulge in psychic practices for selfish ends is very great and many who are drawn to them to-day are

sensationalists seeking to tap reservoirs of power or to satisfy a morbid appetite for the occult. It cannot, therefore, be too strongly emphasised that such abnormal faculties as clairvoyance or trance-utterance have no spiritual value in themselves. Psychic faculties are simply unusual forms of sensitiveness, which are found sometimes in people of very elementary spiritual development, but which may, also, appear in those who have reached an advanced stage in true mystical unfoldment. And obviously it is only by these latter that such faculties can be spiritually employed. To seek to develop them as instruments of power or to exploit them for gain or self-advertisement or even to suppose that any true revelation of reality on other planes of life can be acquired through them by those who are not spiritually altogether emancipated from the desires of the lower self, is to be guilty of the gravest error.

Psychic practices of an esoteric kind can, in short, only be safely undertaken by those who have truly dedicated themselves to the mystical life and who are, also, in a position to receive really enlightened guidance. For those who act upon the knowledge that the only power one should desire is power over one's lower self and the capacity to be of service to others, they may well be aids to integration and to the growth of those finer spiritual faculties which are the higher senses of the reborn man. But without the self-surrender which is the fundamental condition

of any man becoming "a new creation" neither psychism nor psycho-analysis can further real organic growth. And they may well only intensify a disorganic state.

For egoism is far more of a menace in the new world of psychic and psychological experiment than it was in the old world of traditional culture, prudent rationality, and self-interested morality. These at least were safeguards against sub-rational forces, if they were also barriers against supra-rational inspiration. Doubtless in many cases the destructive impulses were only suppressed and either generated a sickly internal conflict or broke out eventually in violent insurrection. But at least the individual was not encouraged to stimulate powers within him which he was not morally advanced enough to control or direct aright. And this is the danger of both psychism and psycho-analysis in irresponsible hands. For in throwing off the rule of a limited reason, the individual is only too liable to abandon himself to a flux of unlimited instinct. The higher consciousness which he seeks in place of the old dead rationalism is not of course to be found in this way. It can only be realised by a long and patient course of self-discipline. The limited rationality, which it is desirable to outgrow, lies, in fact, between two extremes—the superconscious and the unconscious. The faculty of the superconscious is the imagination or intuition; the faculty of the unconscious is instinct. Essentially psychic prac-

tices are intended to foster the growth of the imagination and to strengthen the creative will; while psycho-therapy aims at resolving disabling conflicts and inhibitions in the instinctive depths. And each, rightly administered, can be of creative and curative value. But wrongly administered and to the wrong people psychism can lead men out of the safe citadel of rationality into a wilderness of fantasy or even insanity, while psycho-analysis can inflame a "libido" which it is quite incompetent to sublimate or transform.

To conclude, therefore, we may say that in the new world of spiritual discovery and adventure which is opening out before us it is even more essential than it was in the old narrow world of rationalism to eliminate egoism. To undertake psychic practices in a spirit of curiosity or with a desire for enhanced personal power is a sin against the light. Similarly to believe that any spiritual value attaches to peculiar psychic experiences in themselves or to forget that the quality of any vision and its degree of reality depends on the spiritual grade of the recipient, is to be guilty of gross credulity and superstition. To qualify as a true visionary requires a moral elevation and a purity of motive far beyond that of ordinary mundane standards. And it is only those who are sincerely striving after such inward truth and have dedicated themselves to the mystical life who may safely practise its psychic science.

HUGH I'A. FAUSSET

NATIONALISM: PAST FAILURES AND FUTURE HOPES

[We purposely bring together articles written by eminent men residing in three different cities of the world. All of them deal with the subject of the influence of religion in national life.]

Dr. Hans Kohn of Jerusalem regards Nationalism as destructive of universalism and looks forward to the emergence of a common faith and a universal religion.

Mr. Ramananda Chatterjee of Calcutta, taking advantage of the Ram Mohan Rai Centenary, appeals to his co-religionists to utilize the power of religion in the service of Indian Nationalism.

Mr. Philippe Mairet, joint Editor of *Purpose* (London), writes of the nationalistic renaissance in Asia, particularly in India, and points out that "the clear duty that presents itself to the political minds of Asia is to learn from the supreme mistake of Europe and avoid it".—EDS.]

I.—NATIONALISM AND RELIGION

The recent period of history which started with the French Revolution and with Napoleon's campaigns all over Europe has rightly been called the age of nationalism. But this age was in no way confined to Europe; its influence spread during the following decades over all countries of the earth, and even the most remote countries of Asia, living until then still under the ancient order of their religious traditions, have been touched by the new spirit. Only about thirty years ago Arminius Vambéry, a Hungarian scholar who had devoted his life to the study of the Middle East wrote :—

Religion absorbs the intellect of the Asiatic; it is stronger than his feeling of nationality, for the latter is almost everywhere of second importance.

The same thought was expressed by another scholar in a slightly different way :—

Each religion in the East represents a social group with a more or less self-contained culture, and in many respects the term, "Religion" rather corresponds to what we understand by "nation": indeed the Muslim is accus-

tomed to regard Islam and Christendom as two nations.

But those writers and many other observers forgot one important fact: that even in Europe nationalism and the idea of nationality and of all that it involves is only of rather recent growth, entirely unknown to the Middle Ages, and that the East and even Africa in our days are undergoing under the influence of Europe quick and radical changes in their mental outlook and social attitude. Very few decades after Vambéry had recorded his judgment about religion and nationalism in Asia, one of the progressive leaders of Islam in India, S. Khuda Buksh, wrote in the leading Muslim review in Calcutta that Islam has realized that its future lies in its powers of solidarity and that

that solidarity should draw its strength and sustenance from a scheme of things, real and vital, and that scheme is naught else save that of Nationalism, and Nationalism pure and undefiled. That such is the trend of events is clear to all who seriously scan the political horizon.

And an American missionary, Wilson Clash, corroborates from his observations the statement of the Indian leader :—

The youth of Islam to-day is thinking in terms of politics more than religion. He is often far more interested in his nation's welfare than in the spread of Islam.

The same is true about those old Asiatic religious civilizations outside the pale of Islam—Hinduism and Confucianism. India and China, up to a very recent date venerable, social and religious civilizations, are becoming nations. The Indian National Congress wishes to represent Indian nationhood and national aspirations above all religious and social cleavages of the still powerful past. The fathers and guides of modern China have not been disciples of Confucius, whose sayings and doctrine have moulded during 2,500 years the whole of China's moral and intellectual, social and personal life, but Christians of Chinese origin. It is only twenty years ago that the head of China was a priest-king, the Son of Heaven, and China a theocracy, but to-day nobody is surprised that in present-day China the religion of the ruler is not taken into account. Sun-Yat-Sen was a Christian; Tchang-Kai-Shek was baptized at the time he was the virtual dictator of the Chinese Republic—and this without any protest by Chinese youth, for their interest is entirely concentrated on the Chinese national renaissance.

This historical process by which religion is being displaced in Asia by nationalism as the determining

factor of history—a factor which sets its stamp upon the whole era—was gone through by Europe some hundred years earlier. As the Turkish and the Egyptian peasants a few decades ago considered themselves first of all Muslims, and then Turks or Egyptians, since they were much more united by their common religion than divided by their different ethnical origin or vernacular language, so too the peasants in Europe considered themselves not so very long ago as Christians and not primarily as citizens of different national states. One Church had catered in the same way to their intellectual and moral needs; the same social and religious traditions had governed their lives! All their social and personal life and activities, work and play, government and trade, arts and science, had been regulated and governed throughout Christendom by religion; nothing was left outside its pale. The educated classes of all nationalities then used one language—Latin. There were practically no national barriers, as there was no national consciousness in Europe at that time. Mediaeval Europe (and in many parts of Eastern or Southern Europe the Middle Ages continued into the nineteenth century) was entirely similar to the Orient of some years ago. Life in the East showed a few years ago the same distinctive features as life in the Occident a few centuries ago.

We can thus follow one historical process throughout the world: a universalistic religion like Christianity, Islam or Buddhism, which

tends to embrace the whole of humanity and which in its teaching does not admit any differences between men of different races, ethnical groups or nationalities, is being displaced by a nationalism which overstresses or over-estimates national or racial group consciousness and territorial frontiers. In this process there is a certain return to ancient times: in the past religious consciousness was not universal but tribal. Each tribe or ethnical group had its God. The God belonged to the tribe and the tribe to its God. God fought the wars of his tribe; he was elated by its victories and might become then the God of a mighty kingdom. He was annihilated if the tribe was destroyed by his enemies. The religious and ethnico-political consciousness of the group was identical. God was, for the tribe, "our" God; the aliens had their "own" Gods. Some of those tribes or nascent nations developed out of their ethnico-religious genius higher forms of religion, like the Persians under Zoroaster or the Jews under Moses. But even then their religions remained national religions. Allegiance to one's tribe or nationality and to one's God became identical.

But slowly men developed higher and more sublime notions of God. He became an absolute being which did not allow any other Gods besides himself; he became the God of all humanity, of the Universe. His word or the word of his prophets and apostles went forth to all men. The racial, ethnical or tribal relations of a man

lost their importance. New standards and values, identical for all men of the same faith, became important for salvation and redemption, for all that really mattered. Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, the three great proselytizing religions were striving to gain the whole earth as their dominion, directing man's soul and life towards one goal only—to gain Paradise or Nirvana, eternal life or eternal quietude, something to outlive all terrestrial bonds and allegiances. His religious preoccupations dominated the mind of man; in religion he found security against the dangers of destruction and death. Man has a natural longing to overcome the narrow limits set to his existence in space and time. He does not easily content himself with the short span of years allotted to him by the absolute power whose creature he is. He longs for immortality—to break the narrow limit in space and time which falls to the lot of mortal beings. And he finds this escape from the limitedness of his life in his belief in God, in his faith that he will live an immortal life in Heaven or be redeemed from all entanglements of human life in Nirvana. The mediaeval man knew exactly his position in space and time. Creation, the Fall of Man, Revelation, stood on the one side, Salvation and Redemption on the other; the time between did not have any great importance, it was preparation for the Life to come. Man lived on a small strip of earth, but above him was Heaven and beneath him was Hell, and he knew

that after a short time he would pass, for eternities to come, either to Heaven or to Hell. The place in which he had to live for a comparatively short time, the tribe or nationality to which he belonged, the vernacular he spoke, did not mean much to him; they did not decide and form his inner life, for what was essential was the word of God to all men.

This period of universalism, where religion dominated and nationalism meant nothing, or very little, to mankind, passed in Europe with the secularization of the social, political and intellectual life. Under the influence of rationalism the reality of Heaven and Hell began to be doubted. Creation and Salvation lost their dominating importance; life on earth, the number of years and the strip of soil, of each one gained in importance, became the basis of man's life, activities and thought. Man emancipated his life more and more from the ties of religion which he began to feel as fetters. But at the same time his longing for immortality, for the expansion of his personality, remained; and as he could not satisfy it any more in Heaven which was lost to him, he had to satisfy it on Earth. He had to look for a new point of attachment. He found it in the nation. There was a group of people of more or less the same origin as himself, living on the same soil, speaking the same language. As God, the Father in Heaven, receded slowly into the background, ancestry and descendants, united by common blood, gave to the individual secu-

rity in time; they rooted him in a natural way deeply into the past, they stretched his personal life far into the remote future. Man began to look for his immortality upon earth, by becoming a link in the chain of his people unified by a common history, common territory; by the homogeneousness of the blood which flowed in their veins and beat in their hearts, and by the conformity of their aspirations. Formerly only princes fought for the preservation or enlargement of their territories which were considered their personal property. Now the common people themselves took an active interest in their homeland, the land of their fathers and the land of their children. Nationalism became the driving force in the political, social, cultural, and personal life of the people. Religion often became only a subservient force or an ally of nationalism. National churches and religion were again being established; priests gave their blessing to national wars; sometimes the national and the religious body entered into a close union fighting for the same goal, a national goal, with the help of the weapons and symbols of both the age of religion and the age of nationalism.

The age of religion has at least in principle been an age of universalism, of the spiritual brotherhood of all mankind. Nationalism has even in principle destroyed this universalism, has set nation against nation, fatherland against fatherland. It seems to-day as if a new trend towards new forms of universalism can be noticed.

Nationalism has brought the world to a complete chaos and threatens human civilization with complete destruction. All nations of the earth are confronted to-day with the same harassing problems, the same alarming questions which ask for solutions that a disunited mankind cannot find. National ambitions are conflicting one with the other; the new means of communication have brought nations closer together and thus increased the dangers of conflict; all humanity has begun to be ruled by the machine, its exigencies and its implications. Only a common effort can render the new ways of communication, of science and technology, useful as means for the progress of a humanized civilization instead of, as now, weapons of internecine competition. Man

has learned in the age of nationalism to look upon earth as his real home, and by his discoveries and scientific research to make earth an inhabitable and dignified abode. But he will also have to learn again the eternal truth of universalism which was contained as a message in all the great religions, and to realize this truth in the life of the nations of the earth; otherwise mankind is in danger of decay both morally and economically. The spirit of the new age which is approaching will adopt the universal message; it may come in new forms, but it will certainly restore to life the glad tidings of a brotherly, united mankind, of an end to all strife and clash of nations, races and tribes—in a common faith.

HANS KOHN

II.—THE USE OF RELIGION IN NATIONALISM

Of the three maxims in politics, in ethics and in religion which Rammohun Roy often repeated, the one on religion was from the Persian poet, Sadi, and runs thus in English translation:—

The true way of serving God is to do good to man.

This puts us on the track of the mainspring of his multifarious activities for the welfare of his countrymen and of mankind in general. It was his religious faith. All earnest attempts at reform, whether religious, social, political, or of any other description, are based on faith in the ultimate triumph of truth and justice and

humanity, which is synonymous with a belief in the moral government of the universe. This is an essential element in religious belief. One would, therefore, expect to find Raja Rammohun Roy, the first all-round reformer in modern India, the first to act on the principle of the interdependence of different kinds of reform, above all and beneath all a religious personality. He "made no secret of the theistic passion which ruled his life".

The many and far-reaching ramifications of his prolific energy were forthputtings of one purpose. The root of his life was religion. He would never have been able to go so far or to

move his countrymen so mightily as he did, but for the driving power of an intense theistic passion.

Yet, at the many meetings held on the occasions of the anniversaries of his death during a long course of years, and on the occasion of his centenary also, speakers and writers have, for the most part, dwelt on his achievements as a social reformer, a political worker, a *littérateur*, a linguist and an educationist—very often not even mentioning the fact of his having been a religious reformer, one who worked hard to uproot polytheism and idolatry.

This neglect of the religious side of his personality led the late Dr. Mohendra Lall Sirkar, a great physician and founder of the Indian Association for the Cultivation of Science, to observe at the Rammohun Roy anniversary observance in Calcutta on the 27th of September, 1889:—

In connection with the versatility of the late Raja Rammohun Roy, I hope I shall be permitted to take this opportunity of saying that it is a matter of great rejoicing that he should be claimed by all sections of the community as a man who ought to be admired. Gentlemen, while it is a matter for rejoicing, I must at the same time raise my warning voice that we should not lose sight of the great central truth to the propagation of which the late Raja Rammohun Roy devoted his whole life, and that was the unity of the Godhead. The great aspiration of the late Raja Rammohun Roy was to enable the human mind to acquire the highest truth which it was capable of acquiring, and that was to have a just, correct, and true idea of the unity of the Godhead. I need not dwell and dilate upon the various reforms which he inaugurated; those reforms are

going on rapidly enough. But I must say—and say with the greatest regret—that the greatest reform at which he aimed, namely, to instruct his countrymen in the unity of the Godhead, has not made adequate progress. Of course, you will rejoice at the establishment of Brahmo Samajes throughout India as evidences of the progress of the great central truth which the late Raja Rammohun Roy tried to inculcate; but compared with the masses of this country, who are deeply ignorant of the very fact of the unity of the Godhead, these various churches are but infinitesimal drops to propagate that noble idea. We have not done sufficient to propagate this idea and to do real homage to the Raja. With all our boasted education, we are, gentlemen, practically atheists

. . . . I am an outspoken man, and may be blamed for making these remarks, but still, when I recollect what the late Raja Rammohun Roy did for the abolition of idolatry, and what we have since been doing towards the same object, I must say that we cannot congratulate ourselves upon our energy.

At present there is little or no open advocacy of such idolatry as involves sexual immorality—at least among the educated classes—though widely prevalent idolatry of certain kinds in the South involves the immoral and degrading *devadasi* system. Among an appreciable section of the educated public there is condemnation—at least in theory—of such idolatry as involves cruelty to animals, though it is practised over wide areas on a large scale. But opposition to and condemnation of idolatry as an error, a superstition and an irrational practice unworthy of and unnecessary for civilized human beings, are practically confined to the Brahmo Samaj and some members of the Arya Samaj.

The discussion of this topic is not merely of academic interest. There is a great diversity of opinion on various matters of vital interest to the Nation. But perhaps the greatest measure of agreement that exists relates to the elevation of the political status of the people of India. Opinions differ as to what that status ought to be in the immediate future or ultimately; and opinions differ also in relation to the methods to be adopted for winning that status. But all agree that a change for the better is necessary. It is also agreed that for effecting that change the people of India ought to unite and be better organized. What stands in the way of such unity and organization? I shall not here refer to all the obstacles that hinder unity or make unity difficult for all religious communities. I will take only the case of the Hindu community and refer to one or two obstacles which stand in the way of their unity.

It is a matter of common knowledge that caste and "touchability" and "untouchability" keep the Hindu community divided. But it is not always borne in mind that the worship of some particular god or goddess in preference to, or to the exclusion of, others is, or at least has been, another dividing factor. Sectarian quarrels—sometimes of a sanguinary character—between Vaishnavas and Saktas, Saivas and Vaishnavas, worshippers of Siva and worshippers of the snake-goddess, Manasā, and so on, used to disturb the mutual relations of different Hindu sects to

a great extent in the not distant past. Perhaps they have not yet disappeared from all parts of the country among all strata of Hindus. To the extent that they have disappeared, the result may be due to religious indifferentism or to the fact that present-day worship of some deity or other is not as sincere and ardent among all sections of the Hindus as it used to be in days gone by. In any case, it cannot be denied that the Hindus would be a more united and better organized people, if they individually and collectively worshipped One Deity in spirit and in truth, than they are now. If loyalty and obedience to one supreme political leader make for the solidarity and strength of a people or a political party, can it be doubted that devotion to the One True God would make a people united and strong? The growing feeling among Hindus that there ought to be collective or congregational worship among them, and the increasing practice of *sarvajanin* or all-caste Durgā Pūjā among Bengali Hindus, indirectly prove that unity of worship makes for national solidarity.

Faith in the Supreme Spirit has an energizing and strengthening effect, as it implies belief in the moral government of the universe, and faith in the ultimate triumph of truth, justice and righteousness. Hence worship of the One True Deity and meditation on Its attributes cannot but make for the vigorous conduct of all righteous national struggles and lead to their ultimate success.

For these and other similar rea-

sons Walter Bagehot wrote in his *Physics and Politics* :—

Those kinds of morals and that kind of religion which tend to make the firmest and most effectual character are sure to prevail, all else being the same ; and creeds or systems that conduce to a soft limp mind tend to perish, except some hard extrinsic force keep them alive. . . . Strong beliefs win strong men, and then make them stronger. Such is no doubt one cause why Monotheism tends to prevail over Polytheism ; it produces a higher, stedier character, calmed and concentrated by a great single object ; it is not confused by competing rites, or distracted by miscellaneous deities. Polytheism is religion *in commission*, and it is weak accordingly.

While literate Hindus or illiterate Hindus of some education will readily admit that the worship of the formless *Parabrahma* is the highest religion taught in the Hindu Shastras, at the same time, the vast majority of Hindus, in-

cluding many persons of remarkable intellectuality, will urge that the worship of *Parabrahma* is meant only for great sages and that image-worship is necessary for the generality of men, who cannot grasp the idea of the Formless Supreme Deity. But it is found that among some sects of Hindus, the Bāuls of Bengal, for example, even illiterate peasants are great devotees of the Formless Supreme Spirit. So it is hard to believe that those classes of Hindus who continue to produce successful students of metaphysics, higher mathematics, higher science, etc., some of whom are able to do very abstruse original work in philosophy and science, must be confined to the worship of images, and must not aspire to worship the Formless Oversoul in spirit and in truth, which is man's highest privilege, duty and bliss.

RAMANANDA CHATTERJEE

III.—NATIONALISM AND ARISTOCRACY IN ASIA

When, still dazed with the shocks of war, Europe looked round upon an altered world, she found her prestige as a continent dangerously diminishing. In actual military, political and materially productive power, she was still supreme, but three new factors threatened that supremacy. In the West was America, transformed into the world's greatest financial creditor and for the first time seriously arming. To the East was the violent industrialization of Russia ; and all Asia was stirring, as never before, to answer the challenging

questions raised by Western civilization.

Naturally, the group of peoples once called Christendom, and for so long an oligarchy of nations virtually ruling the world, felt with alarm these omens of declining power, and valued their leadership the more for the danger of losing it. It was natural that they should try to prevent the recurrence of their worse than fruitless quarrels, and—the Western mind being always prone to ascribe its errors and to owe its salvation to some word ending in "ism,"—natural also

that good Europeans should lay the blame upon Nationalism, and seek a remedy in Internationalism.

But what is Nationalism? The question is easily answered: It means the direction of all activities to the good of the "nation," as an ethnic, political and cultural unity within a given geographical area. Such unity is never more than roughly true of any actual State, but Nationalism strives to make it so, by educating the facts into greater conformity. So Nationalism is a dynamic political conception of the State, influencing action in every department of the corporate life. But Nationalism is not the only view of the State that prevails in Europe, and it cannot be said to have been the sole cause of the War. Two other conceptions were fully as active throughout Western civilization—those of Plutocracy and of Democracy. Each is a standpoint from which the whole State can be viewed and action taken accordingly, and unfortunately the devotees of each view believe it to represent the whole truth about the State. They forget that Plutocracy, Democracy and Nationalism are abstract words standing for different aspects of one and the same living reality. And it is that reality, not one of its aspects, which made the War. It was Europe itself—or rather the general style of European life—which led, and could only lead, to catastrophe.

This thought might be of value to the people of Asia—and perhaps especially of India,—now that they are seriously grappling with

modern problems. For they are already making use of this conception of Nationalism to arouse themselves to their new responsibilities, and they may well be daunted if "Nationalism" is only to lead them into an Asiatic war as monstrous and futile as the European, or into a world war even more disastrous. But does Nationalism always and necessarily produce Militarism?

We have seen that it does so, when it is the kind of Nationalism that grows up with Pluto-democracy. So, if Asia is importing from the West a style of modern polity describable in the terms of all these three conceptions, its breakdown in war will soon be predictable with almost astronomical precision. And in fact, Asia is at present importing ideas from all three categories, and moulding her new life accordingly—Japan especially, India largely, and China to a considerable degree. It is not too much to say that Asia is still copying the way of life which in the West is now breaking down in disillusion; and of the factors in that life which are named above, there is no doubt which has proved the worst for Europe and is the most ominous for Asia. For whereas Nationalism cannot be always or inherently wrong (for regional groupings have their right to exist) and Democracy must include at least some truth (for persons are individuals, also with a right to exist), we cannot say the same of Plutocracy, since the wealthy, as such, have no right at all to rule.

Even if the theorem "might is right" were true, it is doubtful

whether wealth could be said to have won legitimate power. Its present position in the West seems to be due to the fatality of European developments, or a coincidence of exceptional circumstances. It was only relatively, as the powers of the Church and the Feudal system weakened, that the merchant class grew in importance and in control of the situation. Land had formerly been the only sure physical basis of social power, but a variety of independent causes made it possible for the merchant class to learn how to control money, by developing new organs and a new technique of finance. By the creation of banking and joint-stock companies the financial credit of a nation could be mobilised for any purpose of which the merchant class approved, and these purposes soon came to include the support of governments committed to its interests. It was soon after this change that industrial production was revolutionised by the use of solar energy from coal, and by machinery. The immense technical undertakings and social changes which followed were only made possible by the new financial powers, which thus attained virtual control of the entire economic life, as the creditor invariably gains ascendancy over the debtor.

The new mercantile-financial class supported the doctrines of democracy, chiefly in order to lead the popular power against the declining rule of the feudal aristocracy, which naturally tended to obstruct the material changes brought about by commercial and

financial ambitions. Thus the Western world progressed to Plutocracy, to the rule of Money. But money is incapable of ruling in any true sense of the word. The merchant mind, even when it rises to the more abstract operations of the financial plane, can only organise for profit, never for the development of human order, happiness or culture.

Proof of this is clear from the last century of Western progress. During that time the financial class has steadily strengthened its grasp of the situation. It has always supported with its credit the most profitable industries—"profitable" meaning those which produce the greatest quantity with the least expense. It has worked therefore to increase production and decrease the consumption of goods. This process can only lead to increasing overproduction as fast as the quantitative technique of industry improves, and the surplus production must therefore be exported. Nor can it be even exported in the fair and equal exchange of trade, for the population which cannot afford to buy its own products cannot afford their imported equivalent. It is sent out of the country in return for interest-bearing bonds. These debts tend to become irredeemable, and they grow so large that even the interest on them cannot be accepted in goods, for the consuming power of the population remains little augmented. Yet in order to seek work for its increasingly-unemployed people, a pluto-democratic nation must always strive for new markets abroad in which

to sell (or oftenest in the result to give away) its produce. Naturally the competition between such nations leads irresistibly towards war.

No doubt the financial class, *qua* individuals, are no less patriotic in sentiment than other persons. But *qua* plutocrats they seek profit, and often by anti-patriotic means. Thus, when the Lancashire cotton industry is approaching ruin through unemployment, they finance the export of cotton-weaving machinery to India or to Japan, assisting competition which must obviously worsen Lancashire's predicament; and such anti-national behaviour is more the rule than the exception. The use of the money-power is a national and international, but even internationally it is not constructive. The complete inability of financiers to co-operate in any statesmanlike view of their function was fully demonstrated by the failure of the World Economic Conference.

No Indian patriot, versed in the lore of his native traditions, can be surprised by this impotence of Plutocracy for constructive rulership. It entirely confirms one of the leading principles of Indian sociology, that ancient science of social organisation, of which the system of castes was originally the exoteric embodiment. Here it was definitely laid down that the merchant caste (the *Vaishya*) was incompetent to govern. Its task was the organisation of the labour of the working caste (the *Sudra*), and of the material resources of the country by means of trade and

finance. The political leadership and discipline of the State were the duty and privilege of the warrior or *Kshattriya* caste, a class corresponding closely with the orders of chivalry in Mediaeval Christian civilization. Those of the *Kshattriya* caste, moreover, were bound by their own code of honour to pay respect to the caste of the teachers (the *Brahmana*) who were the exponents both of the moral wisdom and of the scientific theory of their times.

To adduce the authority of the caste tradition is, I am aware, to risk the impatience of good people both in Europe and India, who are impressed by the evils of "caste" in India, degenerating under present conditions. These evils, however, are irrelevant to the essential principles of the Aryan tradition, a tradition which, with its fourfold analysis of human society, is not only in agreement with the form of Christendom in its most creative period, but is the only universally reliable framework of sociology we possess. Like any other theoretical system it is susceptible of abuse; but I suggest that it may also be used, and with valuable effect, by those Indians who still cherish their understanding of its meaning. For if they look at Western problems in the light of their own tradition, they will see that both the Nationalism and Internationalism of Europe stand condemned for the same reason—that they tend to subordinate everything to *Vaishya* men and methods.

It is a curious fact that European idealists are generally unaware that

Western Nationalism and Internationalism are two manifestations of the same social complex. They associate the latter with the idealistic efforts of the League of Nations (always disappointing in their results), and fail to realise that even the League itself is largely involved with the machinations of a very real "Internationalism," which consists in frenzied efforts of each country to sell its products abroad, even if more cheaply and on more uncertain credit than at home. Against this international activity "Nationalism" retorts by building tariff walls to keep out the unwelcome wealth that would speedily ruin the industries of any nation which did not take such defensive measures. We often hear of international parleys and conferences to induce the nations to lower their tariff walls, but these conferences never propose that the nations should cease their aggressive over-production and under-selling; the nations are asked to give up their defences whilst the attacks continue, so it is no wonder that the talking invariably ends with inaction.

This direction by the merely mercantile mind has turned the magnificent productive powers of Western civilization against itself, and frustrated its cultural and political intelligence. Not that the *Vaishya* type is without virtues: it has great and distinctive virtues in its true function, but in public action it is naturally and necessarily opportunistic and incapable of true policy. What happens under its lack of rule is that impersonal facts

and arithmetical figures increasingly overrule the activities of society, with social consequences of the kind described in Indian scriptures as the "confusion of castes".

The vital question for Asia, therefore, is how to take what she wants from the West, both of technique and of intellectual realism, whilst escaping subjection to Western commercial and financial methods. It would now be impossible, even if it were desirable, for Eastern peoples to refuse to adopt and adapt Western scientific technique to their industrial life; and their intercourse with the West upon a basis of fair and reciprocal trading is of the highest cultural importance to humanity. The clearest duty that presents itself to the political minds of Asia is to learn from the supreme mistake of Europe, and avoid it, by preventing, before it is too late, the accumulation of the power of Credit and Finance in institutions outside their political control. They must curb in time the strong tendency of unregulated finance to exploit their industries for export, and to lead them into the international morass of debts and gold-politics. If they fail in this, the latest curse of the West will descend upon them—that of political apathy and despair, relieved only by illusory hopes of salvation through dictatorships.

There are many idealists in the West who look very far for the solution of this problem of political Nationalism exacerbated by financial Internationalism; they believe it can be solved by the abolition of national sovereignties in a world-

commonwealth. However attractive this may seem as an ultimate goal of mankind, it is at present far too abstract an ideal to inspire any useful action except upon the plane of culture. Nations happen to be the regional and political realities in which we now live: a complete transformation of their internal constitution will be necessary before they will be worthy to be members of such a planetary alliance. World-order can only be approached step by step with the attainment of internal harmony and social justice.

No nation can escape from this vital question of its own salvation into a phantasy of universal world-peace. Nor is there any escape by burying our modern talent of scientific technique, and refusing to use it—least of all, perhaps, for India, which especially needs to face the discipline of mechanism, to submit to the exigencies of physical law in the material world, not only for efficiency's sake but for the regeneration of her spirit. The adaptation of the East to the technical condi-

tions of modern life may well be more successfully achieved in India than elsewhere. For India is busily creating a new nation out of a population as numerous and various as that of Europe, a task which will tax and renew her *Kshatriya* virtues; and there is no reason why she should not set a new pattern of nationhood to the world, wholly different from the post-Renaissance conception of the nations of the West.

It was to India, in ancient times, that the eternal *Dharma* was revealed explicitly, as the four functions of social life and the only true theory of Aristocracy. If she remembers her own wisdom, not in words but in actions, India will not suffer her life to be ruled by money, a function that should serve it. In that case she will not only safely develop the technique which came from the West for the welfare of her own people, but may be able, by the living example of a new social culture, to lead Asia and the world in the ways of peace.

PHILIPPE MAIRET

The respective duties of the four castes, of Brahmans, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, and Sudras, are also determined by the qualities which predominate in the disposition of each, O harasser of thy foes. The natural duty of a Brahman compriseth tranquillity, purity, self-mastery, patience, rectitude, learning, spiritual discernment, and belief in the existence of another world. Those of the Kshatriya sprung from his nature, are valour, glory, strength, firmness, not to flee from the field of battle, liberality and a lordly character. The natural duties of the Vaishya are to till the land, tend cattle and to buy and sell; and that of the Sudra is to serve, as is his natural disposition. Men being contented and devoted to their own proper duties attain perfection.

—*The Bhagavad-Gita*, XVIII, 41-45.

PARACELSIUS

[Geoffrey West is the author of a splendid biography of H. G. Wells and numerous other books. He has a gift for painting backgrounds and when he couples it with spiritual detachment his biographical art easily achieves the rare combination of historic accuracy and freedom of interpretation. Five such excellent sketches he contributed to these pages in 1932, and this year he has prepared a new set of five.]

The first part of the following article on "Paracelsus" appeared last month.—EDS.]

The personality of Paracelsus is difficult to determine, and even more so is his development, save in the very broad stages of apprenticeship and attainment. We have said that he had few friends, and even between himself and his disciples there seems to have been little intimacy. His mother died in his early childhood or perhaps infancy, and after that no woman seems to have so much as entered his life even passingly. He was quite careless as to his personal appearance, and equally indifferent as to the impression he might make upon friend or foe, sparing no one's feelings when occasion might rise to speak his mind. One feels he almost deliberately avoided personal relations, preferring to stand alone. He knew himself always as a God-dedicated man, his eyes unswervingly upon his goal, the real drama of his life within, in his steadfast growth to divine knowledge.

Many works have been attributed to him; some of the estimates are absurd, but the most cautious lists over one hundred on widely varied medical, magic, alchemical, astrological, botanical and philo-

phical subjects. Only a few of these, however, are known to have been written by himself; the majority were either dictated to his disciples or set down by them from his oral teachings. Most were not published for some years after his death, and to settle their order of composition, or of the conception of the ideas they set forth, is an impossible task today. One can but note, and outline them in terms of, their general dominating consistency.

It should perhaps be noted, as a preliminary, that with all his profound insight, he remained to the end of his life, like his teacher Trithemius, a formal as well as devout Christian. The Bible was his earliest and his constant study. In the controversies of the Reformation his sympathies were in many respects clearly with his contemporary Luther, even to the point of distributing in some of his travels the latter's translation of the Bible, and so earning the hatred of the Swiss priests, but he never left the Catholic Church. Yet he could say, seizing the spirit beyond the letter, that "God only desires the heart and not the ceremonies," and

again that "We must read the Bible more with our hearts than with our brains, *until at some future time the true religion will come into the world.*"

Prayer, the aspiration towards the good; Faith, born of a deep knowledge of the soul; Imagination, penetrating to the holy heart of reality—these were the three unchanging foundations of his wisdom both as philosopher and as physician. Necessarily, for his understanding was the source of his power. The physician, he said, must have knowledge, primarily practical, of the world within man and the world without; but also he must have "virtue," a spiritual not intellectual quality. And in fact the basis of his medical practice was neither more nor less than a spiritual perception, the almost—or more than—clairvoyant ability to penetrate the mental or moral cause behind the physical symptom. For, like Mesmer after him, he held most diseases to be due to moral effects and thus capable of remedy only by moral treatment.

This was quite consistent with his philosophy, which was essentially Kabbalist if in some respects it developed a new insight. His universe was spiritual and one, a single essence in all its manifestations. All that was, visible and invisible, known and unknown, had come into being by the spontaneous breathing-forth of the indefinable, incomprehensible primordial cause, the ultimate creative power flowing downward in successive emanations from level to level, from purest spirit to grossest matter,

divided, limited in the captivity of form, yet one from highest to lowest, so that all "below" was ever pregnant with the qualities of all "above," and must ever seek to realise its potentialities in an upward "homeward" journey. Man epitomised the universe, as the Microcosm, all-potential, set in organic relation to the Macrocosm (the terms, H. P. Blavatsky points out, are identical with the Microprosopus and Macroprosopus of the Kabbalah), and, while possessing a certain effective independence, achieved a true liberation only as he attuned himself to universal being. Such harmony was the secret, the necessary condition, of all absolute insight, and its attainment life's highest—and only final—aim. Paracelsus notoriously defined the seven-fold constitution of man in terms familiar enough to later students of Eastern thought, but practically if not entirely unknown in the West in his day even by occult initiates. More simply, he saw man as a being spiritual, intellectual or astral, and physical or animal, each of these three qualities representing a universal level temporarily focussed in individuality, and each self-conscious and perceptive of itself in others according to its achieved degree of development, but also the higher knowing the lower. Thus the beginning of wisdom was self-knowledge, on the physical, then the intellectual, and finally the spiritual plane. "We cannot find wisdom in books, nor in any external thing; we can only find it within ourselves."

This conception of universal

spiritual unity, and the power of spirit to discern and influence spirit in whatever other form, and of the need to proceed first and last by spiritual understanding, at once underlies almost all his writings and makes them all but incomprehensible, where not definitely misleading, to those lacking such understanding. They must always be read not literally, but "without and within". It is not merely that his "salt" and "sulphur" and "mercury" are not the substances of the chemist's shop, but the symbols of spiritual elements. In his lifetime his more impatient and less perceptive disciples complained that he withheld his secrets from them; just so are his writings for those with souls as well as eyes to read.

He was an alchemist, but his art aimed at more precious ends than gold, seeking rather the control of the invisible elements in the universe by "the living power of the spirit". As astrologer too he was equally removed from the bald interpretations of superstitious ignorance. He even wrote categorically: "The stars control nothing in us, suggest nothing, incline to nothing, own nothing; they are free from us and we are free from them." Yet he recognised an astral and chemical affinity between the stars and man. It is indeed difficult to define his views in a few words, but, briefly, he held that man's astral or intellectual nature came from the stars (but the stars understood as symbols of mental cosmic states rather than physical bodies) and is subject to their

influence in the degree that he lacks spiritual development. "Such a person is blown about like a reed, and cannot resist the forces which are acting upon him, and the reason of this is, that he has no real self-knowledge, and does not know that there is in him a power superior to that of the stars." As chemist he undoubtedly discovered or distinguished many new substances and distillations; he has been credited at least with the "rediscovery" of both hydrogen and nitrogen. That he had occult powers born of his profound insight can scarcely be doubted, but few wonders are ascribed to him—even less than to most of his eminent successors; he was always healer, never magician, and he would use his knowledge neither to create faith nor to confound his enemies. Necromancy and sorcery—black magic directed to personal gain—he condemned absolutely, as one realising only too well the dangers of non-moral or evil will acting creatively upon the purely astral plane. He made a very detailed study of the occult properties of plants, and the existence and varieties of elementals and spirits good and evil.

But first and last he was a physician, and as such alone exercised his full powers. Health, he held, was the harmonious functioning in the individual of the universal life-principle, whose invisible vehicle was a magnetic force capable of control by the imagination and the will, and of use by such control for the curing of illness both mental and physical. This was precisely

the "animal magnetism" whose discovery Mesmer was to proclaim more than two centuries later, and Paracelsus also anticipated his follower in his use of the magnet in healing. He was also well acquainted with the principles and no little of the practice of the subsequent homeopathists. Seeing always with organic vision, he discerned his patients as organisms, having life as well as structure; he dissected the living body with the imagination, not the dead body with the knife.

We return at last to the problem of the claim of Paracelsus to be named the Father of European Occultism. We have seen that beside some of his successors, as say Saint-Germain, Cagliostro, or even H. P. Blavatsky, he scarcely appears as an occultist at all. But we have also seen that the occult knowledge was clearly there, that it lay at the bottom of all his work and teaching. And yet, again, he seems to have given to the West little that was in its essence new even in the West; if he saw more deeply in detail, there seems no doubt that his main principles were all implicit and mostly explicit in the enlightened Hermetic-Neoplatonic-Gnostic Kabbalism of Trithemius. Thomas Vaughan, Boehme, and probably Swedenborg all appear to have derived from him in many of their basic ideas.

Even on such grounds the claim might be allowed. But there is another too. For in the very dawn of our modern Europe, it was Paracelsus who, as occultist and

man of spiritual knowledge, chose the path of open understanding and open teaching. Burning at Basle in 1526 the books of Galen and Avicenna—the Aristotle's of mediaeval medicine—he performed an act as symbolically momentous in its implications as Luther's burning of the Papal bull or his translation of the Bible into the common tongue. Paracelsus too lectured in the vernacular that all might hear him, and writing his books he proclaimed his knowledge, if with certain safeguards, where it might be understood by those capable of understanding. It is said of him that as a young man, against all the customs of the day, he directly refused to become member of a society of alchemists and thereby bind himself to secrecy, wishing to gain and give his learning freely. Certainly he did not, as those before him had done, seek to keep hidden the very existence of a secret traditional knowledge; and thereby he established a new tradition, in the West and for the West—a tradition of a declared knowledge open to all who both would and could follow it. Its dangers perhaps are only too plain, even in the examples of some of its greatest exponents. But it is, for better or worse, the Western tradition; the dangers have to be realised, not shirked. Some have accused Paracelsus of throwing pearls before swine—his was the deeper realisation of the presence even in the swine of the spirit which is the essence of the pearl!

GEOFFREY WEST

WHEN MAY WE COMPROMISE?

I.—THE ANCIENT VIEW

[Some ten years ago, G. V. Ketkar helped to found in Poona the *Gita* Dharma Mandala, in order to popularize the teaching of that Scripture given five thousand years ago by Sri Krishna on the battlefield of Kurukshetra.—EDS.]

Compromise denotes the adjustment of two divergent views or modes of thought. It is effected by mutual give and take. By that process a *via media* acceptable to both sides is found out. In cases in which mutual give and take is not possible, a workable compromise is often patched up by a policy of "live and let live". This is not a compromise in the strict sense of the term; it is mere avoidance of conflict. Synthesis, on the other hand, denotes something more than mere give and take. It is a blending of two views into one whole.

The Sanskrit word *Samanvaya*, (समन्वय), is a broader term and includes all the three ways of reconciling divergent views mentioned above.

The science of Compromise or *Samanvaya* is minutely systematised by Hindu pandits. It was necessary to develop that science in order to reconcile apparently divergent passages from authoritative religious texts. These rules of textual compromise are too technical for the common reader.

The *Bhagavad-Gita* is uniformly popular among all schools of Hindu thought. It is regarded as the synthesis of divergent views which evolved with the age-long growth of Hindu philosophy. We see sects

of Hinduism which greatly differ from each other doing homage to the *Gita* with uniform reverence. This unique character of the book is due to a large extent to its methods of compromise. A study of these methods will be useful not only to the philosopher but to the ordinary man of the world. If he does not accept all or any of the *Gita*'s teachings, he may at least derive a great deal of practical wisdom from its methods of synthesis.

Often the misconception underlying a controversy is only about a single word. Controversy arising out of narrow definitions of a word can be reconciled by a broader and all-embracing definition of the crucial word. The word is thus preserved, but a new sense is given to it. The *Gita* has by several bold and comprehensive definitions reconciled opposite views of thought. Take for instance the definition of *Yadnya* or Sacrifice. The original meaning of this word was restricted to the rituals prescribed in Vedic literature. It was applied mainly to the offering of oblations in the sacrificial fire to Vedic Gods. As the Aryans advanced in philosophic thought this custom was thrown in the background. Yet the sanctity and reverence for the

word *Yadnya* (sacrifice) held their sway over the minds of the people. The *Bhagavad-Gita* has reconciled this divergence by widening the definition of *Yadnya* (sacrifice). The act of offering something in the fire is metaphorically applied to several practices necessary for the path laid down in the *Gita*. The material sacrifice of the Vedic literature is not excluded from the long list of sacrifices. Only it is given a lower place than the sacrifice of knowledge. Self-control, study and knowledge are included in the broad meaning given to the term *Yadnya* (*Gita*, iv, 25-30).

When there is unity in substance the *Gita* will not insist on the form. To those who fight for the form the *Gita* will point out the essential unity of the thing in itself. For instance, to those who insist on the words *Sanyasa* and *Naishkarmya*, i.e., renunciation and inactivity, the *Gita* brings reminder of their real meaning. "He who is free from attachment and is undisturbed in his contentment, although he looks to be active he is really inactive" (iv, 20). Those who insist on the word "actionless" may say that the sage is actionless. On the other hand, if others take him to be active the *Gita* says in the next verses (iv, 21-22) that his action is sinless and he is free from its bondage. To one who insists on renunciation or *Sanyasa* it is pointed out that "He is the real Sanyasi who does not hate and who has no desire" (v, 3). The substance of *Sanyasa* or renunciation does not lie in outwardly ceasing to act or wearing a particular dress. The real renunci-

ation lies in the mind. If that is achieved the outward form is immaterial.

There are diverse ways of doing a thing, and while following your own way you must not forget that there are others. If you are performing a certain sacrifice please do not suppose that it is the only kind of sacrifice. "Many and various are the sacrifices offered to the Eternal" (iv, 32). Good things are often spoiled by narrow insistence that they are *the only good things*. One good thing need not be the enemy of other equally good things.

Another requisite for compromise is the avoidance of unnecessary and offensive language. Even after all the broader definitions, relative thinking and analysis, there may remain some small point of difference, which may be pointed out without giving offence. In doing this the *Gita* follows the way of speech which it describes in the seventeenth chapter as "speech giving no offence, truthful, pleasant and beneficial" (xvii, 15). People are attached to a particular form of expression or enunciation of certain truth. It offends them to change the mode of expression, which has acquired a sanctity by time, custom or authority. The *Gita* has ostensibly accepted several time-honoured propositions with almost imperceptible amendment.

The ancient rule was that all action that is done in the performance of the old kind of Vedic sacrifice (offering oblations in fire) was to be deemed righteous. All the rest was sinful action. The *Gita* after widening the meaning of

the word Sacrifice, *Yadnya*, in the manner stated above, has slightly but imperceptibly amended the old rule also. In order to make this amendment possible the *Gita* states the old rule negatively and introduces one additional adjective.

The world is bound by action, unless performed for the sake of sacrifice. Therefore for that sake and *without attachment* you should do your work (iii, 9).

The word मुक्तसः (without attachment) is purposely inserted, and the old rule is amended so as to suit the view of the *Gita*. The amendment is made as inoffensively as possible.

The time-honoured proposition was that he who followed the "Shastras," or writings that have become holy by tradition, can alone hope to attain salvation. Righteous action meant action according to the Shastras; while everything against the Shastras was condemned as sinful.

According to the *Gita* the real division between virtue and sin comes from the inward fact whether the self is overpowered by passion, hate or desire. He who is free from these is the truly righteous. He whose self is overpowered by these is sinful (xvi, 21-22). After describing this real difference in the following verse the *Gita* seems to accept the old rule. On closer examination we see the slight amendment with which the old view is accepted: "He who abandons the Shastras and follows his own desires does not get salvation" (xvi, 23). The word कामकारतः (following his own desire),

is purposely added.

In reconciling and synthesising the difference between various ways of viewing the highest ideal the *Gita* has followed a peculiar method. The highest ideal is regarded by the dualist as becoming of the nature of God (though not becoming one with God). Some regard the highest ideal as coming into touch with Brahman. Others regard it as merging in Brahman. The *Gita* has treated all the epithets as synonyms. You can touch yourself with your hand. You are of the same stuff as your hand is made of. But when your hand is hurt you say that you are hurt, and when something is placed in your hand you say that you received it. Similarly your relations with the Eternal may be viewed from different points. In the highest stage of perfection you may be termed as one with the Eternal or as in touch with the Eternal. The highest stage is a combination of all these relationships.

From the sixth to the fifteenth chapter we find the several old systems of knowledge regarded as differing only in expression and arrangement. Describe the division between spirit and matter as ज्ञान (mutable) and अज्ञान (immutable), as क्षेत्र (field) and क्षेत्रज्ञ (Knower of the field), or as प्रकृति (matter) and पुरुष (spiritual person), or as अधिभूत (Supreme Spirit) अविदैव (Purusha) and अधियज्ञ (Krishna embodied)—they are all systems teaching the same knowledge which is acquired by the practice of Yoga. As long as the knowledge itself is comprehensive and free from "dubious-

ness" (असंशयम्) and "complete" (समग्रम्) (vii-1) it is acceptable as a system of knowledge.

The world is dual—"divine" and "demonic" (दैव and आसुर- chapter xiv) or triple—(सत्त्व, रज and तम्, poise, activity and inertia, chapters xvii and xviii); as long as you endeavour to avoid the lower and try to reach the higher it does not matter how you divide, and what names you give to, the different stages.

The methods of compromise will be perhaps styled as too diplomatic to be suited to a philosophic book like the *Bhagavad-Gita*. But before pronouncing this hasty judgment, one must look to its purpose and the limits of its compromise. The limit is indicated by the two words *Shraddhā* and *Anasuya*, faith or sincerity, and honesty of purpose. Within that limit the *Gita* is full of kindness, sympathy and toleration, but it has no mercy for those who are without. The condemnation of those whose only aim of life is selfish and sensual, is very severe. There can be no compromise with

hypocrites, dilettantes, haters and self-seekers. Only honest and sincere differences can be compromised or tolerated. This will show that the *Gita* is not "facing both ways". When it becomes necessary to state its view explicitly it has done so unhesitatingly (xviii,6).

We have seen that the *Gita* does not effect compromises on account of want of boldness to enunciate the truth. It is because of a larger mental perspective and loftier point of view that the *Gita* sees unity in divergent opinions and beliefs. It looks at them from the highest point of view of Brahman, of salvation. Mistakes in method are tolerated if the movement or progress is unmistakably towards that ideal. From that lofty idealism, differences look insignificant. Only those who have their eyes fixed on a high ideal and who have sympathy for all sincere effort, can effect a real compromise. Otherwise a compromise becomes a makeshift. All compromises in the *Gita* are illuminated with such high purpose and a broad sympathy.

G. V. KETKAR

II.—THE MODERN VIEW

[C. E. M. Joad is a fighter and a philosopher. As the former he gives no quarter to compromise where principles are involved; as the latter, he has a true conception of tolerance and gives way on matters that are non-essential.]

Viscount Morley's celebrated essay on "Compromise," first published in 1874, has recently been reprinted by the Rationalist Press Association in the "Thinkers' Library" (Watts. 1s.). It is a work of high seriousness, the product of

an age in which men did not disdain to pay their readers the compliment of addressing them by argument based upon reason and addressed to it.

Morley's Essay is, indeed, with one exception, in matter the most

effective, in manner the most noble plea for intellectual integrity in English literature. The exception is his master J. S. Mill, who sharing Morley's passionate conviction of man's fundamental, intellectual and moral decency has alone matched the eloquence with which Morley expresses his conviction.

The object of the book is stated to be the establishment of the limits within which compromise in the matter of opinion is justified. Sometimes the expression of an idea is appropriate; sometimes to urge an opinion will give needless pain. There is, it is obvious, a time and a place for the advocacy of one's views; to press them in and out of season is not only bad manners but bad tactics. Fanatics and bores do not make converts. How far do such considerations justify us in compromising in the expression of an opinion?

"Are we only to be permitted to defend general principles on condition that we draw no practical inferences from them? Is every other idea to yield precedence and empire to existing circumstances?" Obviously not! "Our subject is" then "a question of boundaries."

Before I indicate the boundaries which Morley himself suggests, there are two general observations which will serve to show the first the standpoint, the second the occasion of the book. First, in Morley's view, the universe is fundamentally a moral universe. It contains, that is to say, moral as it contains physical laws. Our moral principles and maxims are simply the spirit's intuitive recognition of a moral principle that transcends it. Hence, they are no more to be dismissed as *mere* conventions or conveniences than the laws which physics records:—"The claim of morality to our allegiance . . . rests on the same positive basis as our faith in the truth of physical law. Moral principles, when they are true, are at bottom only registered generalisations from experience." And, as with morals, so also with truth. There are, then, objective truths which mind discovers not devises, objective moral principles which it discerns not invents. Recognition of these factors is the basis of the obligation to intellectual and moral integrity.

Secondly, a number of factors have combined in the modern world to obscure such recognition. Premeinent among these are the effects of the sciences, particularly those of anthropology and psychology, in sapping men's faith in the validity of their ideals by exposing their origin. The application of the theory of evolution to trace the growth of human sentiments and principles has diverted men's minds from the question of their truth:—"The devotees of the modern method are more concerned with the pedigrees and genealogical connections of a custom or an idea, than with its own proper goodness or badness, its strength or its weakness." The modern fashion, in fact, is not to consider whether an idea is true; it is to show why men came to think it true. The results of this method, valuable to the historian and the

anthropologist, are destructive to morals and religion. For men insensibly come to believe that in exposing the origin of a view they have somehow invalidated it. But we are no more entitled to infer that the discovery that religion began as Totemism and exogamy discredits the revelations of the mystics, than to argue that the fact that the savage can only count upon the fingers of one hand invalidates the multiplication table.

To lay bare the roots of things is no doubt valuable; but we must not make the mistake of supposing that they *are* their roots. To do them justice we must seek to interpret them not only in terms of what they began as but also in terms of what they are trying to become; we must judge them, in fact by their fruits as well as by their roots. And it is precisely this which, in opposition to the anthropological-psychological treatment of reason and morals, Morley sets out to do. What, then, is his answer to the difficult questions which he raises? What boundaries does he assign? How far does he permit us to carry compromise without impairment of integrity?

The gist of his answer consists in a distinction between three different though frequently confused things, the formation of opinion, its expression in speech and writing and its realisation in action. In the first sphere we should be absolutely uncompromising. No considerations of spiritual comfort or practical expediency should deter us from laying hold of what seems to

us the truth wherever we may find it, and following it wherever it may take us: "In forming opinions, a man or woman owes no consideration to any person or persons whatsoever. Truth is the single object."

In the second sphere compromise may be allowed its place. "The publication of opinion stands on another footing. That is an external act"; as such, it has consequences both to the author of the opinion, to those who receive it and to the opinion itself. If we wish to improve the world, we must avoid giving pain; if we wish to persuade, we must be conciliatory, as well as convincing.

The third sphere is the sphere of the statesman and the politician. His is the art of at once expressing and moulding the public opinion he expresses, the art which Machiavelli described in *The Prince*. Pursuing it, he must concentrate upon the present rather than look to the future; he must consider what is immediately feasible, rather than what is theoretically desirable.

The distinctions made, the statement of Morley's position is very simple: we must not allow the considerations which are proper to sphere three to invade sphere two; we must not allow the considerations which are proper to spheres three and two to invade sphere one. We must not, and we do. Hence, the spinelessness of contemporary thought, the illegitimate use of compromise, the unwillingness of men to put truth first.

Two related evils are specially denounced. First, the refusal to express opinions because the majority does not hold them; secondly, the refusal to advocate opinions because their realisation is not immediately practicable. These evils result from the invasion of spheres one and two by what Morley calls the "political spirit" appropriate to sphere three. We are never entitled to remain silent when it appears to us that a wrong course is being taken, merely because the majority does not agree with us, or because there is little chance of our protest prevailing:—"As if the mere possibility of the view being a right one did not obviously entitle it to discussion; discussion being the only process by which people are likely to be induced to accept it."

As an example of the current confusion to which Morley draws attention, the confusion, between sphere three and spheres one and two, I take an illustration from current controversy. Young men at English Universities, notably at Oxford, have recently in large numbers resolved that in no circumstances will they "fight for King and Country". The uncompromising terms of this resolution have been bitterly resented by the English papers which, while having no objection to the pious affirmation of pacifist opinions, regard with outraged horror the prospects of action in accordance with the opinions of which

they profess to approve, thus reflecting the attitude of the Christian Churches which, while paying lip service to the teaching of Christ on non-resistance, would be horrified at the suggestion that people should act as if He really meant what He said, or as if what He said was true. In this connection the following quotation from a leader in *The Morning Post* luminously expresses the attitude of mind which Morley denounces. "When the Archbishops and the Bishops enunciate such dubious propositions as that war is a 'crime,' they should remember that juvenile logic *takes them seriously* and carries their postulate to its natural conclusion that 'This House will in no circumstances fight for its King and Country.' (italics mine.)

Morley's own action at the beginning of the war, when he resigned from the Cabinet rather than lend his sanction to a course of which he could not approve, is an equally luminous example of the circumstances in which compromise is not legitimate.

The foregoing bald account gives little idea of the nobility of this book, or of the eloquence with which its dignity of thought is matched. It should be read especially in these days of spreading reaction as an abiding witness to the faith of a generation that still held liberty to be among the greatest of the goods.

C. E. M. JOAD

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS

[This is the third of the series by Dr. R. Naga Raja Sarma, who holds that the works on Indian Philosophy by Sir S. Radhakrishnan and Dr. S. N. Dasgupta have been unduly influenced by western methodology. Dr. Sarma is fully aware that "both the scholars have done splendid service in the cause of Indian Philosophy" but he feels that they have been much too susceptible to the judgment of western scholars and have consequently failed to remain faithful to the spirit of the original Sanskrit Texts. To attempt an exposition of the ancient Hindu Texts so as to make these dovetail with the western philosophical method and parlance involves, according to Dr. Sarma, the serious risk of distorting their inner import.

Last month Dr. Sarma pointed out how "The Truth about the Gita" has been viewed in a false perspective by the two authors. In the following article Dr. Sarma takes the Upanishads as his basis for study. In the last instalment he will deal with the *Brahma-Sutras*.—Eds.]

The reactions of modern minds to the Upanishads range from one extreme of critical judgment to the other—that they are the babblings of infant humanity, or that they are the joy of life and the solace of death. Those who would tread the Aryan Path will have to acquaint themselves with the essentials of the philosophy of a body of texts or tracts which record the earliest Indian reflections on the problems of life and destiny. The Seers of the Upanishadic period were definitely dissatisfied with the values of life and the possessions and opportunities that it offered. Palatial buildings, attractive women, untold wealth, social adjustments, and exploitations seemed to them valueless. They emphasized the intellectual obligation to investigate the problems of life and destiny, and the moral obligation to regulate conduct in the light of the solutions one might succeed in finding. Philosophic contemplation was not the monopoly of man. Women of remarkably critical and speculative acumen participated in the quest after ultimate values

and the quest for God.

Metaphysical investigation has its origin in the mystery of existence itself. Why should anything exist at all? Who brought the universe into existence? Nachiketas (*Katha Upanishad*) and Maitreyi (*Brihadaranyaka*) rejected unhesitatingly the alluring and tantalizing values of this life and wanted to possess the key to Immortality. The Infinite is the Supreme Power controlling the origin, evolution and destruction of the Universe. Fear inspired by the Lord makes the sun shine, and makes the fire burn, etc: "Bhayadasyagnistapati-bhayattapati-suryah"—*Katha*, II, 6,3.; "Bheeshasmat-vatahpavate-Bheeshodeti-suryah..."—*Taittiriya*, II, 8. The finite selves are caught in the meshes of transmigration. They are not free. They are under the control of that Supreme Power. Freedom and bondage are, respectively, the marks of the Infinite and the Finite.

Sankara, the celebrated champion of Monistic metaphysics, maintained that the relation between the Finite and the Infinite is

identity, and that the truth of the Upanishads is the equation between the two contained in the text "Tattvamasi," "That art Thou".* Madhva, the equally enthusiastic champion and illustrious vindicator of the Dualistic and the Pluralistic metaphysics, maintained that the Finite can never be identical with the Infinite. He based his conclusion on the text "Dva-suparna-sayuja". (Two birds or spirits in intimate union). The former text is to be found in the *Chhandogya* (VI, 8,7 *et seq*) and the latter in the *Mundaka* (III, 1).

II

The nature and characteristics of external reality—the world or the environment—naturally depend on the general metaphysical position from which the universe of matter and spirit is contemplated. Sankara and his commentators and followers hold that the universe of matter and spirit, with all of its wonderful multiplicity, is to be regarded as illusory, as mere appearance, and not as reality. They contend that the texts of the Upanishads support the view of illusionism. ("Ekamevadvitiyam," "One only without a second," *Chhandogya*, VI, 2, 1). If the fundamental or basic metaphysical doctrine that Reality is only one be granted, it logically follows that the world of multiplicity cannot at the same time be equally real.

*It is highly interesting and intriguing to note that Madhva suggests that the famous Monistic text should be split up into *Atat-Tvamasi*, i.e., Thou art *not-That*, in the light of the nine illustrative instances mentioned in the said context, and that the very text cited by Monists supports his own Dualism between the finite and the Infinite. European students of Indian thought are yet to know the details of this revolutionary suggestion made by Madhva. For a full treatment of the topic see my *Reign of Realism*, pp. 69-72.

This doctrine of the Upanishads is elaborately argued in later controversial works of Monists, like *Advaita-Siddhi* of Madhusudana Saraswati.

On the other hand, there are Upanishadic texts which proclaim that the universe of matter and spirit, the world of multiplicity, is perfectly real, as real as the Supreme Reality, and not a mere appearance. The Realists and the Pluralists of Indian Philosophy have championed this latter doctrine. The universe is not an appearance of the status of a mirage. It is the evolutionary field for the perfection of man and as such it is bound to be real. "Sa-iman-lokan-asrijata": "The Supreme Being Atman created these worlds (brought them into or endowed them with real Existence)"—*Aitareya*, I, 2.; "Yathathyatorthanvyadadhat": "The supreme being (Isa) brought into existence the objects or constituents of the external world in their fullest reality or with their birthright of reality."—*Isavasya*. This doctrine of Realism is demonstrated with all the paraphernalia of metaphysical debate in later controversial treatises like *Nyayamrita* and *Tarangini*, respectively, of Vyasaraja and Rama-charya.

III

Freedom from the ills of exist-

ence, from the recurring cycles of births and deaths, is the goal of moral and spiritual endeavour. The terms Amrita (the Immortal,) and "Immortality," (Amritatva,) are used in the description of the goal, "Amritamasnute". (A freed spirit enjoys immortality.—*Isa*-11.) Three important constituent elements reveal themselves when an analysis is attempted of the Upanishadic concept of "Mukti," or "Moksha":—(1) Freedom from the ills of existence is prominently mentioned in many Upanishadic texts like those just cited. (2) Realization of the Immanence of the Supreme Over-lord of the Universe is another supremely significant element. The modern mind will ever continue to contend that it is foolish to sacrifice immediate pleasures and comforts in anticipation of the bliss that is to be. The bliss that is concomitant with realization of the majesty and immanence of Supreme Power defies all attempts at conceptual description. Absence of realization of the said Immanence is separation from Brahman. The realization is described as reaching Brahman, "Brahma-praptah" (He reached Brahman); "Brahmasamasnute" (He realises the Immanence of Brahman.—*Katha* II, 6, 14 and 18). (3) The third constituent element is enjoyment of one's own inherent bliss. This is not hedonic happiness. Hedonism as such is the lot of the pre-release career. The bliss that is enjoyed by those elect who have managed to climb up to spiritual heights at which the common run

of humanity would gaze with mute wonder, is totally free from the hedonic hue of the things of this life. Purified or spiritually rectified bliss is enjoyed by free Spirits. Pure bliss, knowledge, and existence would be seen to be the inherent characteristics of selves. But the bliss of the average man is obscured by encrustations of hedonism. All desires are fulfilled, and unalloyed bliss is enjoyed by free Spirits. The ecstatic state of bliss is described vividly in the *Taittiriya-Upanishad*. (III-10). The desires relating to the earthly career are thwarted and frustrated. "The desires of free Spirits, however, are all realized"—"Sarvamscha"—(*Chhandogya*, VIII, 12, 6).

IV

Champions of Monism maintain that when the fundamental Oneness between the Finite and the Infinite is realised, all awareness of difference and Dualism must disappear. A spiritual merger of the Finite into the Infinite occurs, and that is "Moksha". Supporters of Dualism and Pluralism maintain that free Spirits do not lose their individuality in the state of final release but retain the same intact. Whether the goal be Oneness or retention of spiritualized individuality intact, it is obvious that the Upanishadic texts can be cited in support of both the doctrines. The *Chhandogya* text "Ekamevadvitiyam" (*Only one without a second*) and the *Brihadaranyaka* text "Sarvamatmaiva-abhoot," (It is only the

one Atman that has projected the appearance of the *entire* universe) (VI, 2-1 and IV, 5, 15 respectively), have been tenaciously clung to by the Monists; and the Dualists and Pluralists have consistently appealed to "Etat-sama-gayannaste": "He sits singing this Saman"—He abides or rests in eternity singing this Saman (Ecstatic Euphony) (*Taittiriya*, III, 10, 5) and to "Yamevaisha-vrinute-tena-labhyah": "The Supreme Being can be realised only by him who is chosen and elect (of The Supreme being)." (*Mundaka* III, 2-3.)

V

When the author of *Indian Philosophy* remarks that "The Upanishads had no set theory of philosophy or dogmatic scheme of theology to propound," and that they "do not contain any philosophic synthesis as such of the type of the system of Aristotle, or of Kant, or of Sankara" (Vol. I, pp. 140, 141), he throws overboard the traditional interpretation of the sacred texts. When he asserts that the Upanishads "are not conscious of any contradiction between" Sankara's Advaita or non-dualism "and the modified position of Ramanuja" (Vol. I, p. 259), he appears in the role of an interpreter of the Upanishads, of a peacemaker whose offices will be repudiated by the custodians of the traditional truths of the Upanishads. It should be fairly obvious that, in any attempted elucidation of the relation between the Finite and Infinite, oneness or identity between the two and

radical difference between them cannot be reconciled with one another, however earnestly one may desire to bring about such a reconciliation. If one believes or endeavours to make out that the Upanishadic Seers did not perceive any contradiction or incompatibility between two doctrines that are radically opposed to one another, he is according them scant honour and does scant justice to their philosophical intellect and acumen.

From the author of *A History of Indian Philosophy* Sankara gets recognition. "But comparing the various systems of Upanishad interpretation," he writes, "we find that the interpretation offered by Sankara very largely represents the view of the general body of the earlier Upanishad doctrines..." (Vol. I, p. 42), and that "the sum and substance of the Upanishad teaching is involved in the equation Atman=Brahman." (Vol. I, p. 45). In holding these opinions he has exhibited himself to be a faithful follower of western interpreters. He surely could not have been ignorant of the Indian tradition that the Pluralistic Theism of Ramanuja and Madhva has been claimed to be the sum and substance of the Upanishads. If the highest teaching of the Upanishads be "That art Thou," and if the sum and substance of the Upanishads be the equation Atman=Brahman, he need not have made the Upanishadic sages unable to "ignore the claims of the exterior world" to which they had to accord a reality. Why make Upanishadic sages look ridiculous to

oblige modern research scholarship? If they were Monists, they surely felt no philosophic urge to grant any concessional reality to the Universe. If they were *not* Monists, surely then, they considered the Universe to be as real as the Supreme Brahman itself.

VI

Mincing matters is the most mischievous method of philosophic criticism or interpretation. The critical estimate that the Upanishads reveal a hotch-potch of philosophical tendencies in their incipiency, such as Monism, Pluralism, Idealism, and Realism, is but a faint copy of the achievement of Western Orientalists. With the best of all possible good and sympathetic intentions, Western critics do not, perhaps they cannot, appreciate the genius of the indigenous system of the Vedanta. If the fragments of Heraclitus, dialogues of Plato, and the "Enneads" of Plotinus can be interpreted as containing systematic speculation on the life and destiny of man, there should be no difficulty in interpreting the Upanishads in a like manner. In interpreting them, however, the true traditional orientation should not be effaced or eliminated.

Western students of the Upanishads should be distinctly told that there has been a traditional Monistic interpretation of the doctrines, and a Pluralistic one equally hallowed by tradition. Sankara is the champion of the Monistic tradition and Ramanuja and Madhva are the champions of the Pluralis-

tic. Sankara's great and fascinating doctrine of illusionism should not be diluted to meet criticism by Western scholars. When the author of *Indian Philosophy* writes that the "Upanishads support the doctrine of Maya *only in the sense* (italics mine) that there is an underlying reality containing all elements from the personal God to the telegraph post" (Vol. I, p. 197), he does violence to the genuine Vedantic tradition. If the author of *A History of Indian Philosophy* felt convinced that the "Sages of the Upanishads had already started with the idea that there was a supreme controller or essence presiding over man and the universe," (Vol. I, p. 43) he should have seen that the sages would not have established the equation between the Finite and the Infinite. The said equation and the controllership cannot be established as equally valid, without doing violence to genuine Vedantic traditions.

VII

One should not whittle down Sankara's Monism with a view to gaining recognition from Western critics. If the West can understand and admire the Monism of Kant and Spinoza, it should have no difficulty whatever in understanding and admiring the Monistic edifice of Sankara. When Sankara interprets the Upanishads on a Monistic basis and maintains that Brahman is the only reality, he stands committed to an illusionism from which no escape is possible. The illusionism, how-

ever, does not mean any repudiation of morality and religion, a practical programme of secular and spiritual activity. Bradley proclaimed that morality is an appearance; Sankara did the same, centuries ago. If the West can admire Bradley, it cannot condemn Sankara with any philosophical grace. Modern Eastern interpreters of Sankara should not whittle down Sankara's Monism or the Upanishadic Monism. The West must be told that Sankara's interpretation of the Upanishads is not the only one. Ramanuja's interpretation of the Upanishads and Madhva's are equally hallowed by Indian tradition.

VIII

If one elects to model conduct on Sankara's Monistic interpretation of the Upanishads, he will realize that the values of life are error-ridden. This realization will intensify moral dynamism, spiritual effort and endeavour. Though the values of life are "error-ridden" (Adhyasta) and appear in a plane that owes its phantom existence to failure to realize the Foundational Oneness between the Finite and the Infinite, no one is going to sit idle with folded hands, steeped in pathological quietism. The Oneness is going to be realized only by pursuing a programme of activity based on Truth (*Satya*), meditation on the nature of the Supreme (*Tapas*), on restraint of the passions (*Brahmacharya*), and on practised perception of the relation between the Finite and

the Infinite, (*Samyag-jnyana*). (*Mundaka*, III, 1, 5)

If, on the contrary, one chooses to regulate conduct on the basis of the Theism and the Pluralism of Ramanuja and Madhva, he should endeavour to earn the Grace of the Lord which alone will liberate him from the recurring cycles of births and deaths. On the Theistic and the Pluralistic view, the values of this life, though emphatically not error-ridden, will not attract genuine aspirants, as they are evanescent and obstruct smooth spiritual progress. One should shake himself free from the shackles of these values. (Putraishana-Vittaishana-Lokaishana.) The programme of the genuine aspirant will be one of selflessness, sacrifice and service, as he apprehends the import of the immanence of the Lord in the Universe. It will thus be obvious that Western attacks on Upanishadic illusionism are vain and futile. There is no illusionism according to Ramanuja and Madhva. Sankara's illusionism is no bar to moral vigour, no bar to constructive secular and spiritual activity, no bar to nation-building programmes, no bar to effecting an enthusiastic triumphant entry into the Kingdom of God. Whether one elects to act under the Monistic or Pluralistic programme, he will easily realise that the Upanishads seriously counsel abandonment of the feverish passion for the values of life. The modern world, if it likes, may find in the Upanishadic teachings a message of hope and of peace.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

CHRIST AND SATAN*

[John Middleton Murry has been busy with various activities—literary, philosophical, socialistic. Of late Socialism of a certain shade has been his main interest. To give expression to his views on problems philosophical and literary, he has recently started his new journal *The Wanderer*. In the following article Mr. Murry draws a suggestive contrast between the hopeful message of Dostoevsky and the ugly pessimism of Merezhkovsky who "seeks to impose this utterly alien conception on Jesus Himself". Madame Blavatsky defined Pessimism as "that chronic suspicion of lurking evil everywhere". In the true Esoteric doctrine "The real evil proceeds from human intelligence and its origin rests entirely with reasoning man who dissociates himself from Nature. Humanity then alone is the true source of evil."—EDS.]

Merezhkovsky first made a name in England before the war, as the interpreter of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky: in particular of Dostoevsky, with whom he had a certain affinity. Therefore, one compares him instinctively with Dostoevsky: and, alas, the comparison is shattering to Merezhkovsky. Whereas Dostoevsky emerged, through intense suffering, spiritual and physical, into a new love of, and faith in mankind, Merezhkovsky's sufferings under the Bolshevik regime—he escaped to Paris, I remember, in 1921—have turned him into a hater of his fellows. Whereas Dostoevsky in *The Brothers Karamazov* prophesied the emergence in Russia of a new type of man, in the character of Alyosha—a man who should deliberately break away from the Church, and yet live the full free religious life taught by Jesus: a character which, there is some warrant for believing, is actually emerging in Russia to-day, in spite of all the superficial appearance of Atheism—Merezhkovsky

sees nothing in contemporary Russia save the manifestation of Anti-Christ. Essentially his book on Jesus, with all its curious panoply of erudition, expresses one immense revulsion from the present and from the travail of growth. It is an intensely ugly book; it represents the shrivelling process of a soul that has failed to respond to the education of suffering.

Inevitably it is vitiated by a colossal egoism. The purpose and intent of Christianity is really, for Merezhkovsky, to justify a "Christian" war of annihilation against modern Russia. Merezhkovsky represents Christ, the Soviet Union represents Anti-Christ. And although Merezhkovsky does not call, in so many words, for a religious crusade, his motive is unmistakable. To support this purpose he needs must have recourse to a kind of Manicheism. His figure of "the unknown Jesus" has no humanity. He is not conceived or imagined as Man. He is a mysterious and half-sinister power whose

function it is to defeat and annihilate his enemy, the Devil. Merezhkovsky insists on the reality of Satan: for him, indeed, it is the reality of Satan which gives meaning to Jesus.

If there is no Satan, then the Lord saw nothing fall from heaven and gave nothing to man on earth; his whole life was a struggle against nothing, for nothing.

Such a statement, I confess, fills me with horror; it is, I believe, precisely what Blake meant by an "hermaphroditic blasphemy". This is, indeed, "Religion hid in War". And perhaps we should go to Blake for the noblest modern statement of "the ancient and everlasting gospel" of which Jesus was the first clear spokesman to the West:—

Satan, my Spectre ! I know my power
thee to annihilate

And be a greater in thy place and be
thy Tabernacle,

A covering for thee to do thy will, till
one greater comes,

And smites me as I smote thee, and be-
comes my covering.

Such are the Laws of thy false Heav'ns;
my Laws of Eternity

Are not such. Know thou, I come to
Self Annihilation.

Such are the Laws of Eternity, that
each shall mutually

Annihilate himself for other's good, as
I for thee.

Of this gospel Merezhkovsky knows or wants to know nothing. He prefers to play the gospel of the "Unknown Jesus" against the gospel of the known Jesus, which is the same as the gospel of Blake. He wants to annihilate not himself, but the enemy; and therefore he

does not understand that the Satan, on whose objective reality he insists, is the projection of his own egoism. The inevitable corollary of this is that he regards the created world as inherently evil, and seeks to impose this utterly alien conception on Jesus himself. No one who happened to be ignorant of the New Testament and went to Merezhkovsky's book for an account of Jesus, would ever dream that the figure of Merezhkovsky's imagination was the author of the parable of the Prodigal Son, or of the saying that Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like a lily of the field, or that the Kingdom of Heaven was of such as little children are.

In other words, Merezhkovsky's Jesus is not a teacher of profound spiritual wisdom who suffered death rather than betray his own insight, but a magical and supernatural figure whose real purpose is to avenge Merezhkovsky on his enemies. No one would deny that such a conception of Jesus, or Christ, has played a part in the Church tradition. D. H. Lawrence wrote well concerning it in the early chapters of "Apocalypse". But this is perhaps the least worthy of all the unworthy strands that have entered into the complex pattern of Christian tradition. It is unworthy of both the historical Jesus and the Eternal Christ: and no amount of esotericism or erudition can conceal its fundamental inhumanity.

J. MIDDLETON MURRY

* *Jesus the Unknown*. By Dmitri Merezhkovsky (Jonathan Cape, London. 12s. 6d.)

Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy, Vol. I. By C. D. BROAD. (Cambridge University Press. 21s.)

Mr. C. D. Broad has both explained and criticised at length in this first volume the philosophical system of McTaggart's *The Nature of Existence*. He has also in places entered into an independent discussion of some of the topics dealt with by that philosopher. He shows indeed great regard for the acuteness and the power of intellect of his one-time teacher, but one easily finds from his detailed criticisms that he is not much in sympathy with his philosophy. This is, however, what was to be expected. There is a wide gulf separating the two thinkers. The principal writings of McTaggart before he wrote *The Nature of Existence* related mainly to Hegel's philosophy. Whatever, therefore, his differences from Hegel in method as well as in substance, he has entered upon the philosophical quest in the same spirit of self-assurance and of boldness of speculation. Broad on the other hand is more modern, and his principal writings show much greater acquaintance with the present-day science and the Cambridge school of realistic thinking to which he belongs. Nothing, therefore, is more natural to him than a fundamental distrust in a metaphysical adventure such as McTaggart's. He writes:—

.... the omens are highly unfavourable for the success of any system of constructive metaphysics, such as McTaggart's, since even the best shots have hitherto bagged nothing in this field but chimeras. (p. 12)

That McTaggart's system on the whole fails to satisfy, may be granted. A purely intellectual construction of reality may indeed never succeed in satisfactorily answering the ultimate questions that suggest themselves to our thought; because an intellectual construction of reality would involve reason assuming the role of omniscience. The proper role of reason is analytical and critical; it is not intuitive; and intuition alone can ultimately resolve all our doubts. I do not suggest that mys-

ticism is the last word in philosophy. But I do suggest that reason must be guided by our intuitions, and these are not restricted to the sensible. He therefore argues well who sees well. Metaphysics as the science of the super-sensible is possible, because the super-sensible cannot be denied. It confronts us whenever we seek to go thoroughly into the meaning of our ordinary experience. We may have no intuition of a super-sensible reality such as God. But we cannot deny all intuition of the super-sensible reality which we call our self. And is not this self the image of God? Metaphysics can build from this as Advaitism does.

The philosophical conclusions of McTaggart cannot well be stated in brief. But there is no doubt that, according to him, reality is ultimately pluralistic, and that the elements of this pluralism are spirits. He reaches this conclusion by a very elaborate argument, the principal links of which are (1) that "substances" alone exist in the primary sense; (2) that every substance is infinitely divisible in some dimension or other; (3) that this infinite divisibility would lead to very unsatisfactory consequences, unless we can provide a sufficient description for every term in the series according to a rule which does not involve any reference to the infinite series of subsequent terms in which the substance can be subdivided; (4) that this rule can be no other than the principle of Determining Correspondence; and lastly (5) that this principle is only satisfied if spirits are the only true ultimate particulars, or in other words if they alone constitute the primary set of parts of the universe.

If the spiritual character of reality can be justified only by the above argument, it rests on very weak foundations. The basic assertion of McTaggart that every substance is infinitely divisible is not at all self-evident to us; and unless it is true the rest of the argument is quite pointless. That every thinkable or knowable content is infinitely divisible we do not

doubt. But there is no ground whatever for supposing that all reality is thinkable. As we said earlier, our self can neither be imaged nor even thought. Indeed we may be said to have a certain intuition of it. McTaggart thinks we know the self as that which has the character of being a self. But is this "being a self" an objective character at all? It is because of the fundamental non-objectivity of the self that we are told in the sacred Hindu scriptures, the Upanishads, that the self that sees cannot be seen, that the self that hears cannot be heard, and so on. Would it not be absurd to suppose that any such reality, if it existed, would be infinitely divisible? And yet McTaggart is either unacquainted with such views, or he has offered no knowing or intelligent criticism of the same.

Broad, to a certain extent, recognises the plausibility of the contention that the old orthodox Christian view of the soul as simple and indivisible might be correct. But his argument that certain statements about the soul that are unintelligible to us may represent fact is to say the least of it unphilosophical. The problem arises that a soul that is simple and therefore immortal could also never come into being. How can this be reconciled with the Christian ideal that the soul is created and comes into being? To justify this Broad argues:—

But I may have good reason to believe that there is a fact corresponding to a certain statement S which is unintelligible to me, and I may have good reason to believe that there is no fact corresponding to another statement S' which is equally unintelligible to me and is of the same general form as S. (p. 145).

But what are we to understand by "good reason" here? We may indeed never be able to know the unlimited and the infinite through our reason alone. But there are also in reality no limits to our reason. It is in fact our only instrument of truth, being capable of answering every legitimate question about metaphysical reality and of dissolving every illegitimate question through analysis; even intui-

tive perception has to be interpreted by reason. Unless then we have unlimited trust in our reason, and do not rest with mere belief that is not intelligible to us, metaphysics would be a poor intellectual game.

We now come to the more common objects of our experience. Here Broad agrees with McTaggart that a process has successive temporal parts and is therefore divisible in the dimension of time. But he thinks, as against McTaggart, that a *thing* cannot be divisible in this dimension. Now, if by a thing we mean something unchanging and eternally fixed, it cannot be so divisible. But then it cannot be said to have a history. If, however, as Broad thinks, it does have a history, can we draw a real distinction between a thing and a process? We think not.

It is really meaningless to say, as Broad says, that "the endless temporal divisibility of the history of a continuant would be compatible with the complete indivisibility of the continuant itself". (p. 350)

Broad combines with the above error another about events. He sees no clear impossibility in the notion of an instantaneous event. But an instantaneous event would have ceased before it started to be something. It could not begin to be, endure, and then cease to be. If it went through any of these crises, it would have to go through all of them; and is it conceivable that all these different crises, so incompatible with each other, could be rolled in one instant temporally indivisible? An instantaneous event is thus a contradiction in terms.

McTaggart defines substance as that which exists and has qualities. Different philosophers have disagreed with him for different reasons. But taking the definition to be correct, it at once follows that two substances will have two different sets of qualities. McTaggart expresses this fact in what he calls the principle of the Dissimilarity of the Diverse. According to this principle, "any two particulars must be dissimilar in some respect which is not a mere

analytic consequence of the fact that they are two". This appears to us to be quite obvious. Broad, however, thinks that the principle is not true and that exceptions are *conceivable*. He takes two sensibilia, such as two noises, which are in all respects exactly alike, and then goes on to say :—

It is then logically possible that there should be two sensibilia which were exactly alike in sensible quality ; which either had no temporal relations or were simultaneous ; and which had no spatial relations, and therefore could not have spatial dissimilarity.

We think that here logic is all against Broad. If the two supposed noises are exactly alike in every respect and have no relationship to a third something which can define them differently, by what logical conceivability can they still be spoken of as being two ? Broad has ruled out the possibility that one noise occurs in one place and the second noise occurs in a different place. According to him, we must not confuse sensibilia with certain physical events of which they are believed to be manifestations. He has also ruled out the possibility that they are heard by two different minds. What is it then that prevents this two-noises universe from becoming a one-noise universe ? It is just the logical inconceivability of regarding two such noises as two that is most evident to us. In reality, if two sounds cannot be distinguished in themselves as two particulars, they can only be distinguished because two different minds differently placed can vouch for their difference.

Another important point also requires to be considered here. If McTaggart's principle of the Dissimilarity of the Diverse is admitted, then every particular must have an exclusive description, i.e., description which it alone has. When this exclusive description of a term "refers to no merely designated particulars, but consists wholly of universals, it is called a sufficient description".

The first question to be asked here

is whether an exclusive description can be couched in general terms and without reference to any designated term. This does not appear to us to be possible. A description which is wholly in general terms is a description of which we can never say that only one term can have it. In order that a particular should be exclusively described, its description should contain a reference to the whole universe of particulars which determine it to be what it is and where it is. It is, therefore, no exaggeration to say that to know a particular completely, we must know all its possible relations to other particulars, and therefore we must know the whole universe. But would not that involve an endless series such that no particular could be exclusively described ? An answer to this question depends upon what we think as to the nature of the universe. If the universe is a rounded-off whole in space and time, every particular can be exclusively described in relation to every other particular ; if not, then any description would be after all incomplete and cannot be properly exclusive. We here disagree with Broad's suggestion that A can have an exclusive description even when its relation to all the terms of an unending series is not defined. The series being unending, the exclusive description of any term is not an attainable possibility.

The whole problem of McTaggart's philosophy arises from the two propositions : (1) every particular must have a sufficient description, and (2) every particular is infinitely divisible. The details of his solution are not easy to follow. But it appears to us that the whole problem is unreal. McTaggart proceeds from postulates that cannot be accepted and definitions that are questionable. Broad's criticism of McTaggart is in several places fair and just. The book is therefore of great value to those who want to study McTaggart critically and evaluate his philosophy.

G. R. MALKANI

John Ruskin : An Introduction to Further Study of his Life and Work. By R. H. WILENSKI. (Faber & Faber, London. 15s.)

To a vast number of people Ruskin was the epitome of an age and the social conscience of a generation ; yet he can be convicted of uttering in language that ranged from juvenile gusto to an elaborate and purple rhetoric, contradictory opinions on many subjects. He was obsessed by the idea of the moment, but he had not the concentration to push to its conclusion any of the grandiose schemes of his tormented mind ; and, although he possessed that gift of a great writer which can make the trivial seem important, when reading his books one is aware of a lack of direction and of an unstable background.

It is this atmosphere of contradiction that Mr. Wilenski, through evidence taken from diaries and letters, tries to clear by collating the many-sidedness of Ruskin's pronouncements with the circumstances existing, and with his state of mind, when they were uttered. The result is a thoroughly worth-while book. It is scrupulously documented and consists of two parts : the first biographical, and the second analysing the development of Ruskin's ideas in the fields of Art, Social and Political Economy, and War and Religion.

Mr. Wilenski's thesis is that Ruskin was the life-long victim of manic-depressive insanity and personal obsessions, and that his writing and his lectures were actually ways of escape from himself and the means of rationalizing his self-indulgence. The relentless progress, and the results, of this mental illness from youth to old-age are worked out in an impressive way and told in a sympathetic narrative which, if it may appear at times controversial, is on deeper inspection hard to controvert.

To Mr. Wilenski Ruskin was a great, in the sense of being a good, man. His theories were essentially personal, for he could never have tied himself to

any organization. He said bewildering things about most of the subjects which attracted him, and he was able to flaunt embarrassing statements in (for instance) his lectures on religion, because he invariably followed the astounding with a quotation from the Bible ; for he knew how to administer the final sedative to a disturbed audience. The mobility of his ideas, driven backwards and forwards by the compelling power of his mental illness, was such that anybody could quote Ruskin in any sense on any subject on which he had touched. Carlyle called him "a bottle of beautiful soda-water," and his writing was described by a contemporary as a "mass of soapsuds and whitewash," but his propaganda was vitally potent for he brought to it "all his resources—his gift for sonorous writing, his power to put down an exciting half-truth in an arresting phrase, his generous indignation, his bitter wit. He brought to it all his manic overstressing and all the devices of the experienced showman to procure his effects."

He expounded the hidden fears and discontents not only of himself but of his age, and if the cure was too big for him to handle or was given too queer a twist for his followers to grasp, yet they accepted what a more clear-sighted generation might have discarded as emotive rhetoric, that drug which will induce most men and women to believe anything. Again and again in this book these unbalanced utterances are explained as Mr. Wilenski unearths some fact of Ruskin's life that brings us to understand, and so excuse, the lapse ; till we realize that the impulse to preach, and the seeming arrogance, were purely the outcome of the continued illness of his mind.

Of his unfortunate marriage, of his Puritanical up-bringing and his mother-complex, and of his attacks of madness ; of the chapters on Ruskin as an art critic, as a writer and as a student of war, there is not space here to write, but they are one with the rest of the book, well thought out, well

argued, and well expressed.

Mr. Wilenski has shown us, with immense ability and industry, the dependence of the public side on the personal side of Ruskin's career, and has revealed the difficulties that hampered all his strivings. We see a child who never grew up, and at the same time a manly genius of magnificent qualities and impregnable honesty, achieving greatness in the face of almost intolerable psychic handicaps. Intellectually ahead of his day, he saw what we now accept as the basic truth underlying many problems, but, goaded

by something beyond his control, it was in the development of those truths that he became lost among the clouds of his own obsessions. To generations who have known the War and the slump, the spectacle of Ruskin scolding, dogmatizing and wailing may be a little ridiculous; but Mr. Wilenski is a modern, brave enough to turn back to this nineteenth century thinker and to respect his thoughts as applied to our present-day troubles.

He has, indeed, set out to re-establish the right of a prophet to his title.

A. R. UBSDELL

The Pulse of Oxford. By D. F. KARAKA, with an introduction by Robert Bernays, M. P. (J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., London. 2s. 6d.)

This is a very readable little book, delineating the intellectual and social aspects of life in the University of Oxford. It is written by an Indian student who has achieved the distinction of being appointed President of the Oxford Union Society.

Perhaps the best portion of Mr. Karaka's book is that which deals with the pacifist resolution adopted by that Society in February 1933; a resolution which caused a great furore at the time. We are, however, more interested in "The Social Aspect". The young author treats it as "a fallacious theory" that "Oxford is the home of a debauched, degenerate, good-for-nothing type of youth, a waster of his own time and his father's money, indulging excessively in drink, and leading a life of general dissipation". On the other hand, we learn from this book that the University Journal, *Isis*, in April 1933 printed an article deplored "the pernicious erosion in the flower of English manhood caused by the steady growth of feminism," and stating that "every day more students are lured away from their books by the superficial charms of powdered sirens". With Mr. Joad's article, "The Revival of Hedonism," in

a recent issue of THE ARYAN PATH fresh in our mind, we are inclined to think that the *Isis* on the whole may have been right, and to regard our author's assurance that "the Oxford of to-day is not the place for the loosening of the moral fibre" (p. 69) as at least debatable. In fact, there is much in this book which goes to show that an average undergraduate at Oxford is inclined too much towards sense-gratification, and does not care for things of the Spirit.

The fantastic Oxford Group Movement and the Student Christian Movement come in for good-natured sarcasm at the hands of the author, and he very admirably hits off the idiosyncrasies of the former. It is sad that there is no really sound organization at Oxford and other Universities for the spiritual upliftment of students for whom fortunately the creeds and dogmas of Christianity have now no meaning. Mr. Joad has written:—

For the first time in history there is coming to maturity a generation of men and women who have no religion, and feel no need for one. They are content to ignore it. Also they are very unhappy and the suicide rate is abnormally high.

Mr. Joad's own latest book *Counter Attack from the East* should form an excellent basis for discussion as to the right line for the alleviation of this sad state of things.

J. P. W.

Some Turns of Thought in Modern Philosophy: Five Essays. By GEORGE SANTAYANA. (Cambridge University Press. 5s.)

Published under the auspices of the Royal Society of Literature, the five essays by Santayana respectively on Locke's Naturalism and the Philosophy of Commonsense, on the Ethical studies of Bradley, on the theory of Relativity and the New Physics, on Freud's view of Death, and on Julien Benda's view of the Infinite, notwithstanding their clearness and stimulating character, do not contribute anything substantial to a satisfactory solution of the persistent problems of Philosophy and of the problems connected with quest after the Infinite, *Brahma Jignyasa*, as understood by the Vedanta. Santayana who proclaims himself to be "the most recalcitrant materialist" (p. 66) pats Locke on the back for his naturalism and philosophy of commonsense; voices his undisguised disappointment with British and German Idealism; believes that the latest revolutions in science like those championed by Einstein would never yield "ultimate insight" (p. 79); reconciles himself to the inevitable fact that Death is the goal of Life, clutching at a suggestion made by Freud that death is just the manifestation in organic life of the phenomenon of inertia, and chronicles a confession of his faith that "conceived reflectively, . . . when deployed into the realm of essence, infinite or indeterminate Being truly contains *entertainment for all eternity*" (p. 117). (Italics mine)

Santayana is by no means the first to avow recalcitrant materialism, and he will surely not be the last. Thousands of years ago, the CHARVAKAS had anticipated Santayana and others who think after him. Comfortable existence, social and national solidarity, exploitation of the weak and helpless, lip sympathy with suffering and starving fellowmen, an easy moral conscience which reacts with a subscription to a charity, grafted on to an Infinite in the realm of essence and to the notion of spirit as "actuality of feeling, of

observation, of meaning" (p. 120)—will never yield a profitable and logical system of philosophy, will never explain God's ways to man, and man's ways to his fellows. If Santayana does not feel the intellectual need for such an explanation, he is taking up exactly the attitude of the CHARVAKA who in the history of Indian thought maintained consistent and uncompromising materialism and counselled: "Eat, make merry and when the angel with the darker draught draws up to thee, take that and do not shrink."

Is Santayana's Infinite which is Essence, or which is in the realm of essence, a Power which is not ourselves that makes for righteousness? Is his materialism an explanation of the problem of evil, and of difference, inequality, and the countless contradictions revealed by life? Above all, is his materialism a dynamic inspiration for moral conduct? At the slightest touch of a critical, rational analysis Santayana's materialism, albeit recalcitrant, resolves itself into the well-known philosophy of bread-and-butter—a philosophy which can readily be embraced by the "thick" as well as the "thin" in the words of his guru—James. A materialism which freely employs in its jargon "spirit," "man in whom spirit is awake," "pure spirit," "Intuition of the Infinite," "realm of essence," loses itself in spiritualism, psychism, and other allied "isms". To the one significant question and the related minor ones summed up earlier, Santayana's materialism affords no answer at all. The Vedantic systems which proclaim that the whole universe of organised and unorganised matter and spirit is an emanation of God, and that realisation of His Immanence by devotional contemplation and service to His creatures, and riddance of the recurring cycles of births and deaths, would be the goal of the moral and spiritual efforts of aspirants—possesses greater survival value than Santayana's materialism. I may perhaps emphasize in conclusion that the two references to Indian doctrines made by

Santayana are not accurate. Karma is not a "myth." (p. 99) It is an inexorable Law. Whether union with Brahma (p. 116) is "conscious" or unconscious, or beyond the realm of the conscious and the unconscious, are yet unsettled problems of the Vedanta.

Santayana can throw no light on them. Yet, his present essays with their clear analysis and forcible style are refreshingly stimulating and thought-provoking as all his dogmatisms and pronouncements generally are.

A PEDESTRIAN ON THE ARYAN PATH

Essays in Zen Buddhism: Second Series. By Prof. DAISETZ TEITARO SUZUKI. (Luzac & Co., London, and the Eastern Buddhist Society, Kyoto. 20s.)

It is an arduous task to try to give an explanation of a form of mysticism which laughs at logic, ignores Scriptures and resolutely refuses to be tied down to any particular creed or set of ideas. It is true that the greatest intuitions of the human mind are personal experiences which cannot be described or communicated to others, still less condensed into a set of dogmas, but no religion is so intent as Zen Buddhism to sweep away every substitute and symbol of Truth, lest in our ignorance we should take the shadow of form for the substance of reality. Logical explanations, conceptions, beliefs—all intellectual attempts at divine knowledge are disposed of with a thoroughness which makes one feel somewhat taken aback. But there is method in the madness of Zen, and for many years Prof. Suzuki has striven to interpret this unique form of Chinese mysticism to the Western mind. In 1927 he published his first series of *Essays in Zen*, in which he outlined its history and gave an extensive account of its teaching and discipline; and now he has followed it up with the second series, dealing principally with Zen meditation. The book consists of some three-hundred large and closely packed pages, and it is a strange irony that so much should be written about a philosophy which has described sacred books and scriptures as "lists of ghosts and sheets of paper fit only to wipe the puss from your skin". Indeed, we are informed that a third and fourth series

of essays will follow, but it must be remembered that Prof. Suzuki's work is considerably enlarged by a certain amount of repetition and large quantities of illustrative material drawn from the dialogues and sayings of famous Zen masters.

Zen (which is a Japanese corruption of the Sanskrit *dhyana*) has been summed up as

A special transmission of Wisdom outside the scriptures;

No dependence upon words and letters;

Direct pointing to the soul of man;

Seeing into one's own nature,

and thus far it would seem to be much the same as other forms of mysticism. The difference, however, lies in the highly dynamic and thorough-going nature of Zen, which seeks to strip the Soul of every shred of intellectual and emotional veiling by an intense effort to see into one's true nature involving the use of a curious and unique method known as the Ko-an Exercise. Man carries about with him a vast burden of attachments, distorted ideas, emotions, selfishness, worries and hankerings; the purpose of the Ko-an is to empty the heart of all this rubbish until it feels that it possesses nothing and is possessed by nothing. This state is called the realization of *Sunyata* or Emptiness, akin to the "spiritual poverty" of Western mysticism which is attained, according to Tauler, "when thou canst not remember whether anybody has ever owed thee or been indebted to thee for anything." Such is Nirvana, where every fetter is broken and self is forgotten in the All Self. Now the Ko-an is a peculiar form of problem which may be compared to a piece of brick used to knock at a

1934]

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

183

gate; when the gate is opened the brick is thrown away." An example of the Ko-an is the problem suggested by this dialogue:—

When Chao-chou came to study Zen under Nan-ch'üan, he asked, "What is the Tao (or the Way)?" Nan ch'üan replied, "Your everyday mind, that is the Tao."

Or again:—

When asked why Bodhidharma brought the Zen teaching from India to China, a master replied, "It is like selling water by the riverside."

These Ko-ans are easy compared with Hakuin's famous problem, "What sound is made by the clapping of one hand?" On the face of it, it would seem that the Zen masters are talking mere nonsense, but Prof. Suzuki points out that the Ko-an is a problem for the intuition rather than the intellect—a problem so baffling and so fascinating that one's whole intellectual capacity is exhausted in trying to find the solution. When this *impasse* is reached the disciple feels as if he had come to the edge of a precipice, or as if he were a rat forced up a blind alley; there seems to be no way of escape, and the time has come for crossing the frontier between intellect and intuition. Prof. Suzuki writes:—

Psychologically, this is accomplished when what is known as "abandonment," or "throwing oneself over the precipice," takes place. This "abandonment" means the moral courage of taking risks; it is plunging into the unknown which lies beyond the topography of relative knowledge.

And with this act of abandonment and self-surrender there comes about the state of *satori*, the sudden flash of Enlightenment!

ALAN W. WATTS

Psychical Research: The Science of the Super-Normal. By HANS DRIESCH, translated by Theodore Besterman with a foreword by SIR OLIVER LODGE. (G. Bell & Sons, Ltd., London. 5s.)

Ever since the establishment of the Psychical Research Society in 1882, experimental work has been carried on in the domain of psychic phenomena

lightenment brought into being by the giving up of all the fetters and attachments to which we look for the satisfaction and solution of our longings. But there can be no success in dealing with the Ko-an without that intensely positive and almost violent effort of searching which the Zen masters describe as "a great spirit of enquiry" to be persevered with "as if a poisoned arrow were piercing a vital part of the body, or as if one were surrounded on all sides by raging flames, or as if one were disgraced owing to one's inability to pay off a debt of a thousand pieces of gold". Such is the force of concentration required for attaining Enlightenment!

Besides being an interesting work from psychological and religious points of view, Prof. Suzuki's book merits the careful attention of scholars and orientalists. In addition to a thorough understanding of his subject, the author has a marked ability for scholarly research, and it is beyond question that he has done more to promote a knowledge of the history and psychology of Zen Buddhism than any other writer of the present day. His book is exquisitely illustrated with a number of collotype reproductions of old Chinese and Japanese pictures and its only disadvantage is that, being a collection of essays published from time to time in the *Eastern Buddhist*, it lacks continuity and good arrangement. And we would warn those wishing to read it not to do so without consulting his first series of Zen Essays, or a large amount of the present volume will be found hard to understand.

by eminent scientists, psychologists and others, and a mass of facts collected regarding telepathy, thought-reading, clairvoyance, mediumship, etc. It was, however, admitted by Sir Lawrence Jones, President of the Psychical Research Society, in an address delivered in November 1929 before the Oxford Society for Psychical Research, that

the phenomena of Telepathy, for instance, "have been classified and labelled but we are still ignorant of the underlying laws of thought which make such things possible". (THE ARYAN PATH, June 1930). A prominent member of the Psychical Research Society, Mr. W. H. Salter was constrained to admit in his article on Psychic Research in the latest edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* that "for the most part the 'debatable phenomena' of 1882 remain almost as debatable in 1929".

The paucity of results from all the experimentation and research of half a century are also admitted by Prof. Driesch. He refers to "our young science" (p. 87), and remarks:—

Only hypotheses are possible about the fundamental principles, hypotheses which must be advanced in full consciousness that tomorrow they may be demonstrated to be false. (p. 108)

This might be true of an absolutely new science, but what are called "psychic phenomena" were not only carefully studied but also were rationally explained in the East even before the dawn of civilization in the West. Five years before the establishment of the Psychical Research Society, Madame Blavatsky in her *Isis Unveiled* placed at the disposal of the Western world a mine of authentic information on the psychic phenomena which are being laboriously investigated in the West. Such, however, is the intellectual vanity of the West, that its scientists prefer to blunder on, fruitlessly deceiving themselves with the belief that they are investigating hitherto unexplored territory.

The whole structure of modern psychical research rests on the institution of "mediums". In this connection, Prof. Driesch makes certain extraordinary suggestions which, in the interests of the moral and spiritual well-being of humanity, must be unequivocally condemned. Prof. Driesch suggests in all seriousness that the number of mediums or "metagnomes" as he calls them, following Boirac, should be increased "by suggestive or chemical means"

which were described by him in 1927 in the *Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research*. Not content with this reprehensible proposal Prof. Driesch recommends that mediums should be treated suggestively in order that they may overcome certain limitations which act as hindrances to them. Our author says:—

The attempt should be made to educate mediums by Coué's method of suggestion, that, either with or without hypnotisation, they should be repeatedly and convincingly "suggested," "It will go all right in very strong red light (even in white light), without singing, without a chain," and so on; this should be done twenty to thirty times and more. (p. 24)

Prof. Driesch would not have written this and much else in his book if he had had any real knowledge about the constitution of man and the workings of the human mind. In an article on "Black Magic in Science" contributed to *Lucifer* in June 1890 (reprinted as U. L. T. Pamphlet No. 19) Madame Blavatsky said:—

Experiments in "suggestion" by persons ignorant of the occult laws, are the most dangerous of pastimes. The action and reaction of ideas on the inner lower "Ego," has never been studied so far, because that Ego itself is *terra incognita* (even when not denied) to the men of science.

Prof. Driesch is a reputed biologist and philosopher and was the President of the Psychical Research Society in 1926-27. Nevertheless, we doubt whether this book will evoke enthusiasm in any quarter. Sir Oliver Lodge in his Foreword refers to "the extremity of scientific caution which is displayed throughout."

Indeed, much of the book is taken up with the discussion of the possibilities of deception in psychical research, the forms of possible deception, and the precautions which should be taken in conducting experiments.

Barring men, who deny the possibilities of psychic phenomena, we think none will be better or wiser for reading this extremely dull and uninspiring book, while students of true occultism cannot help condemning it unequivocally.

J. P. W.

Indo-European Folk-Tales and Greek Legend. By W.R. HALLIDAY. (Cambridge University Press, London. 7s. 6d.)

This collection of the Gray Lectures for 1932 by the Principal of King's College, London, reflects the modern attitude towards folk-lore, the attitude of a superior and learned grown-up towards the babblings of infant humanity. Folk-tales are considered "genuinely works of art, if of a simple and relatively unsophisticated kind"; myths, the primitive attempts at science; fairy tales, primitive literature; and legend, primitive history. And the lecturer dismisses with mild amusement "the once fashionable attempts to give an explanation of legend as possessing some hidden esoteric meaning". This is a pity. One respects his patient research upon the correspondences between Greek and Indian tales, the variations due to the process of diffusion or to the jigsaw fashion of combination; upon the modifications produced by creative literary art, historical study, or motives of propaganda, and upon the ages of different versions, etc. But one can only regret the time thus spent on non-essentials. Folk-lore treated this way becomes unprofitable, merely a phase of the mania for collect-

ing and cataloguing objects and facts.

Certainly there have been many foolish, forced interpretations of myth and legend, and there has been, during the lapse of centuries, much distortion. The Greek myths, for example, are already caricatures. Yet despite the denial by modern authority, the fact remains that there was a definite basis of knowledge, a real meaning behind the folk-tales in the beginning. Universal Science has always existed, but every age has its ignorant rabble, its learned wiseacres, and its true scientists. Those men of knowledge who invented the pure myths and allegories had been taught the secrets of Nature that modern scientists have still to discover. Further, the science of Symbology has several departments; therefore each true allegory can have several interpretations, so that there is ample room for research along these lines for those who are attracted to the old tales. If the modern students could put aside preconceived ideas and take hold of the Ariadne's thread offered by the books of H. P. Blavatsky, they would find the way out of their labyrinth of details and guesswork into the understanding of the fundamental principles of the subject.

WINIFRED WHITEMAN

Modern Thought on Trial. By KENNETH INGRAM. (Philip Allen, London. 8s. 6d.)

Mr. Kenneth Ingram's decision to attempt a judicial examination of the ideas of the moderns at the bar of critical opinion was not taken lightly. As he says, however, the task cried out to be done, for there has been scarcely any sympathetic and impartial criticism based on true understanding. Born in the 1880's, matured before the war, but still young enough to be active in life and thought, Mr. Ingram has the double advantage for the task of personal experience of the pre-war social, moral and religious standards against which the moderns are in revolt, and in addition, of being

personally intimate enough with the moderns to understand their outlook sympathetically. As a general rule, you are all for the moderns or all against them, the third possibility being that you want to convert them to a philosophy of your own. The attempt, therefore, fairly to weigh the claims of tradition against the spontaneity and self-expression on which the moderns bet their lives, was one bristling with difficulties.

Every line of Mr. Ingram's book, however, is readable with interest. He has striven to be scrupulously judicial, and the case of the Self-Expressionists, in the first third of the book, is presented with knowledge and an unswerving determination not to misrepresent.

Throughout the trial, it is as if a kindly, liberal-minded father kept on saying to his children : "I believe in, and I can rationally demonstrate, the supreme truth and value of monogamy, permanent marriage, the family, God, Christianity, and the gradual humanisation of social conditions ; and I think that your promiscuity, trial marriages, easy divorce, government crèches, atheism, contempt for religion, and discordant shouting for Utopia or Dictatorship this week, all wrong ; but as I cannot stop you, go your way, don't be more extreme than you can help, and my blessing be upon you at any rate for your truthfulness." Mr. Ingram, therefore, gives no good hidings and never abuses ; and it may be that his kindly manner will gain him the ear of the young Self-Expressionists who have at present only contempt for vows and little use for consciousness, so that they may elect themselves to the task of renewing personal responsibility and religious consciousness, and without giving up truthfulness or

spontaneity.

Mr. Ingram has well shown that very much of the traditional self-discipline is essential to the development of mankind, and that the old basis of fear of the body on which the acceptance of the discipline used to rest must be replaced by one from which all "puritanical" fear shall be cast out. One aspect of the issue, however, appears not to have been given full weight. The disillusion, unbelief, and hatred of moral codes experienced by youth seem largely the unavoidable consequence of the uncertainty and insecurity of the present world—in which youth is so little encouraged to fulfil itself in that instinctive happiness once possible through creating a family, and in the satisfaction of aspiration once possible through achieving a career. Youth, in other words, seems sick with discouragement, and to recognise this appears necessary for it to attack the problems of all kinds which it has inherited from its once falsely optimistic predecessors.

A. NEWSOME

Indian problem—which he regards as insoluble—that it would be more profitable, in a larger sense, to get out of the country. Such is Mr. Charles's reading of the Hindu character after, one understands, six months' experience of India.

One turns with some relief to the happier pages of the other book. A while ago, Sir Albion Banerji was telling a group of us at the East India Association just what is wrong in India and just what can be done to put matters right. Now he has written this interesting volume as a development and expansion of his thoughts. It is especially valuable to everyone who wants to see the Indian problem in a clearer focus, because its author takes a detached, non-party attitude, and because he is not a politician, full of empty catchwords, but a practical administrator with thirty-five years' experience.

He gives here an extremely lucid

and able survey of the essential realities of India's present position, with a brief indication of the historic forces which have tied the country into its undeniably tangle. He defends the British rule where it is right to defend it, but he does not hesitate to criticise it where it is right to do that. "It is not reasonable to argue that the miserable lot of the teeming masses is due to any neglect on the part of British rule," he asserts. Farther on, he makes it clear that the loss of the British connection would bring about chaos and the break-up of India into unhappy fragments. Nevertheless he would have the British honour their pledges, surrender their monopoly of control, and grant the Provinces and

States full autonomy and responsibility. His practical policy also includes (1) a political truce with Great Britain, (2) an economic treaty with the British Empire, and (3) a great national effort to counteract the evil effects of communalism.

I take much pleasure in his hope that "India will wield a mighty influence in a new world still in the making if she conserves and not destroys her spiritual force and inspiration." Sir Albion's wide sympathies and successful record justify this addition to the long list of books about India. It constitutes an authoritative contribution of such value that one unhesitatingly commends it.

PAUL BRUNTON

Opening the Psychic Door: Thirty Years Experiences. By F. W. FITZSIMONS, F. Z. S., F. R. M. S., with Illustrations. (Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., London. 12s. 6d.)

This book is an addition to the already enormous literature of Spiritualism. Its author is evidently an earnest, sincere, high-principled man, but withal exceedingly credulous, by which we mean that, having satisfied himself that the phenomena he witnessed were not fraudulent, he has accepted them all at face value as the bona fide actions and utterances of ex-carnate human personalities. So convinced is he that he does not attempt to notice or discuss any of the alternative theories which have been put forward to explain the happenings of the séance room.

The greater part of the work is devoted to a summarised description of a long series of séances held in South Africa early in the present century. Both medium and sitters seem to have been good, kindly, well-meaning folk of English or Irish origin; and, as might be expected, the "spirits" who communicated were of the same type and nationalities. The communications received are full of ethical advice, but display a deplorable lack of aptitude

when dealing with metaphysical or philosophical questions. The following verdict on reincarnation by one of Mr. FitzSimons's "spirit" instructors is typical of the misunderstandings and bad logic which appear to be even more prevalent in the "higher spheres" than they are on earth :—

... Reincarnation, in the way it is taught on earth, is not true... For a discarnate body to take possession of a physical body, with the object of reliving his or her earth life again, would not be logical, or even common sense. For instance, in order to take possession of the physical body of a baby, it would be necessary to eject its own spiritual body; where then would be the ultimate benefit? It would mean that one spirit, in pursuit of his own selfish desire to relive a life in the physical body in order to gain further experience, robs another soul of its body. Believe it, or not, my friend; at the moment of conception a new soul is created, and the tiny spirit, thus born, goes on unfolding evermore.

The "spiritual spheres," as described by Mr. FitzSimons's instructors, are simply this world over again: there are houses, nursing-homes, gardens, woodlands, in the after-life, cathedrals of the Anglican persuasion for the pious, and for evil-livers, slums or worse. The "spirits" talk English, and continue to use the English names that were theirs on earth. Granny is still Granny in this other-world, and

"spirit" children babble with gay irresponsibility through the mouth of the medium. Indeed, if the coloured frontispiece may be accepted as evidence, ex-carnate young women are given to the use of lipstick! The whole conception of the post-mortem life, as depicted

in this and similar works, is naïve and childish.

Some of the psychic phenomena, however, described in Mr. FitzSimons's book, are of considerable interest, and some really striking examples of "spirit" photographs are reproduced.

R. A. V. M.

Little Arthur's History of the Twentieth Century. By CICELY HAMILTON. (J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., London. 5s.)

The work describes in the form of a recital to little Arthur by his teacher, both of whom are supposed to be living in the distant future, the social and political maladies of the twentieth century, and how the world cured itself of them. It is a popular example of those Utopias which are the day-dreams of political thinkers, who seek to escape from the ills of their age and clime into the golden age. The work is written in a simple, vivid, and bantering style, and although all of it is not meant to be taken too seriously, three leading ideas stand out clearly, and no doubt represent the author's serious criticism of things as they are at present.

(1) The author believes that "a sense of their own responsibility in life is one of the best qualities that a man or woman can have," and therefore, she deprecates the present day social services as undermining individual responsibility. Hence her condemnation of extensive Education by the State, of the glorification of the Child, and the pampering of criminals. An extremely amusing account is given of the "monstrous regime" of Inspection, which ends in a revolt against Inspectors, and a "Social Service Massacre."

(2) "What we will not do out of wisdom or kindness, we will do because we hate or fear." Obviously a modern version of Frederick the Great's well-known estimate of "that damned race" of men. It is not a

matter, therefore, for surprise when we learn that the World State and the era of peace came to be as a result of a "Great Stampede" when London and Paris were threatened with aerial attacks. "When they had been thoroughly alarmed and saw what such panics meant in suffering and loss, they agreed together to give up sovereign rights."

(3) "The knowledge of what is called Applied Science because, it is a very great power, is also a very great danger to the world; and those who are trained to hold such power must be carefully chosen, and prove they are fit to be trusted."

The author describes an era of scientific brigandage which followed the spread of education and knowledge not accompanied by parallel moral development. To us in India the idea is neither novel nor alien. According to the doctrine of Adhikara (competence), a teacher should impart knowledge to the pupil by stages according to receptivity, and particularly after assuring himself of the moral fitness of the aspirant to knowledge.

On the economic side the author imagines production as having become so bountiful that unemployment of large numbers becomes inevitable, but those who are unemployed are given a living allowance and are known as "Parries" (short for parasites or Pariahs) as opposed to Citizens, who alone have a voice in public affairs,—another indication of the author's distaste for the present day schemes of Social Insurance.

N. S. SUBBA RAO

THE LAND OF PSYCHE AND OF NOUS

[A. E. Waite is well known for his many valuable books—veritable flames of old knowledge which are worth an exchange with more than one modern bulb. Every quarter he will give to our readers the benefit of his researches and reading of the many periodicals containing matter of interest.—EDS.]

Among things psychical, the outstanding event of these last months in London was a "social gathering" arranged by the National Laboratory of Psychical Research, when Monsieur René Sudre was entertained at dinner and welcomed by some ninety other guests, including many well-known and a few illustrious names.* The meeting, however, had other objects than to honour one who, "after Professor Charles Richet" is described as "the leading French investigator" in the realms of supernormal experiment. It was called: (1) To emphasise the importance of such experiment, if pursued on a scientific basis. (2) "To stress the necessity of research work being carried out at British Universities and by official science, and the establishing of lectureships." (3) To create "an international journal for the recording and co-ordination of scientific psychical research all over the world." It does not appear that the last of these schemes was more than the subject of commendatory allusion,† while the proposed work at Universities and the endowment of lectureships were mentioned twice

only,‡ the accent throughout being laid on the urgency of inducing authorised science to recognise the existence of a great body of parapsychological facts and its claim that they should be examined adequately. For the rest, the address of Monsieur Sudre on "the Bridge between Psychical Research and Established Science" may be not unduly regarded as of high importance within its own measures, assuming, that is to say, the reality of the phenomena and approaching their supernormal character apart from any spiritistic hypothesis. In the lecturer's considered view, there is "no scientific evidence for survival". So far the organs of Spiritualism have passed this over in silence.

The second event of the period was a flying visit to London of Dr. L. R. G. Crandon of Boston, U.S.A., whose wife is the famous and ever-debated medium, Margery.§ He was entertained at dinner by the London Spiritualist Alliance, gave interviews to representatives of two well-known journals ¶ and lectured at the Rooms of the Alliance on Dec. 19th last, his subject being

* Bulletin VI of the National Laboratory, pp. 5, 6.

† Ib., pp. 31, 38.

‡ Ib., pp. 12 and 36.

§ Light, Dec. 15, 1933, p. 801.

¶ Ib., Dec. 22, pp. 816, 817, and The Two Worlds, Dec. 22, p. 982.

"The Vindication of the Margery Mediumship."^{*} The affirmations were (1) that the long-promised *apologia* of the American S. P. R. had been delayed by financial difficulties, but was now on the threshold, a volume of 500 pages, with 104 plates; (2) that the alleged identity between "Walter" thumbprints and those of a certain "Dr. Kenner" would be disproved therein; and (3) that further evidence of supernormal fingerprints and so forth, under test conditions, would be adduced. This is how matters stand at the moment, and it may be added that the President of the Alliance suggested to an approving audience that Dr. Crandon should convey "hearty thanks" to Margery "for her self-sacrificing work as a Medium". Whether this was precipitate or otherwise time may shew. Hereof are activities and rumours from the Land of Psyche.

Passing now towards another realm, Mr. A. Romney Green offers in a recent study[†] an instance of his personal predilections on a recurring question of the people, their preachers and their teachers. After ages of priests, prophets and philosophers, what in fact is the object of life? He cannot accept the answer of Mr. D. H. Lawrence and agree that "the great purpose of mankind" is "a passionate union in actively building a world," because he has failed to explain the "sort of a world" to which we must put our hand. He will not seek,

with Mr. H. G. Wells, the meaning of life in co-operation, for Wells in like manner has omitted to tell us with whom co-operation is proposed and for what purpose. Mr. Green on his own part suggests (1) that because the "fine arts contribute nothing to the material welfare of society," they must for such reason "be amongst the absolute ends of life"; and (2) that pure science is in the same position, even if incidentally useful. Following his own canon of criticism, the answer to this is *negatur*, because in his haste he forgets to inform us why, and this seems fatal. It happens, however, that Mr. Green ignores presently his triplexity of absolute ends and substitutes another, claiming that it will "appeal to the natural instincts of every unsophisticated person". The "ultimate aims of human life" are "to do adventurous things, to make beautiful things, to understand wonderful things"; and it is felt that even "the average man" will subscribe hereto. It is to be doubted very much, especially when the essayist's love of paradox leads him to affirm, on the score of adventure, that "to go to sea in a small boat is to seek the kingdom of heaven. . . . , however unconsciously". But Mr. Green must be dissuaded from believing (1) that either average people or natural instincts have any part as such in his posited absolute ends or ultimate aims; and (2) that his alternate trinity is a "more articulate mode of stating" that the end of

man is to "serve and to know God" and "to enjoy and glorify Him for ever". The latter definition belongs to the limbus of pietistic imagery which has passed with the pictured "eternity of antheming," or if it lingers still it is in the byways of religious emotionalism. Not all the wit of his pages nor all their paradox will veil the fact that his supposed "definition" is untrue within the measures that he applies it only. We do not reach heaven if we seek to cross the Channel, but we may get to the French coast uncomfortably; we do not attain our ultimate end of life by painting a first-rate picture, but we may find it hung on the line and we may sell it. In fine, we can miss that end, even when we have come to understand "many wonderful things"—for example, why our philosopher and friend persists in parading things material when he means to talk of the eternal. If we raise his second triplexity to that plane it begins to obtain at once; but at once also its clauses prove "familiar in our mouths as household words". Who has not heard that the quest of God is a Divine Adventure? Who does not know with Spenser that the "noble heart" is not alone "with child of glorious great intent" but actually makes and brings forth "the eternal brood of glory excellent"? And lastly, if we have not proved it in our own persons, have we not met with those who, because they have lived in sanctity, have found the Holy of Holies, to be that which it has not entered into the

heart of ("the average") man to conceive, and that which God has prepared for those who love Him? At best, therefore, Mr. Green has put some old wine into new casks, and it befalls that we savour it better when drawn from those time-immemorial vats from which we drank it, in very sacred cellars.

Those who are willing to agree that "there can be no religion without revelation" may find it profitable to examine a brief thesis by Canon D. S. Guy on "Experience and its Claims in Religion."^{*} They will learn (1) that Theology is a science; (2) that "Christianity is a veritable science"; (3) that the Christian creeds "are a summary of truths learnt in the school of experience," not excepting that which passes under the name of Athanasius, damnatory clauses included. The office of experience is thus to promote dogma, while the office of evolving dogma is to extend the field of possible experience. It follows in the unwary hypothesis that a certain quality of inward life on the part of believers has not only given us the virgin birth in Bethlehem, the physical resurrection of Jesus, the ascent of his body into heaven and its location at the right hand of God the Father Almighty, but also the descent of the disembodied Christ into hell and the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son. Furthermore, "the Christology of the creeds" being "the result of the Church's experience," it follows also that no time limit can

* *Light*, Dec. 29, p. 835.

† *The Contemporary Review*, No. 816, pp. 712-721, s. v. "The Objects of Life."

* *The Contemporary Review*, No. 817, pp. 72-79.

be ascribed in the logic of the thesis to the extension of experience or the fuller evolution of doctrine therefrom. Canon Guy might reconsider Newman's Essay on Development from this point of view and also the position in which his affirmation places himself. The finding-in-chief of the last Vatican Council is as much, *ex hypothesi*, the result of experience attained through centuries in the Roman fold as the Pauline testimony that if Christ be not risen our faith is vain. But it fails otherwise fatally because, if a "school of experience" has provided the Christian religion with "creedal summaries" of truth, we have to remember that older schools have provided Oriental religion with different bodies of doctrine; and where is the canon of criticism by which we are justified in accepting one and rejecting all the rest? Where is the key of distinction between valid and illusory experience? It is obvious that the experience of sanctity is everywhere; but if creeds are results thereof it is obvious also that they exclude each other. The way of escape is to challenge the statement that creeds are born of experience: they are of revelation—if one cares to think it—of invention, imposture and so forth, or of growth from small beginnings. And as to experience, that which is valid in religion is that from which there issues no strife of sects. It is that of the inward man, who has sought and found it

at the centre of his own being, and the records of his experience have said *ab origine* the same thing everywhere, speaking "the same language," since it "comes from the same country."*

When Dr. Robert Assagioli,[†] writing from Rome, presents at considerable length his purified version of "Psychoanalysis and Psychosynthesis," it looks for a moment as if he were pointing a direct path from the Land of Psyche to the Land of Nous. He tells us that beyond the conscious self "there must be a permanent Spiritual Centre, the true Self"; that it is "fixed, unchanging, unaffected by the flow of the 'mindstream'"; that it is characterised by "real unity and uniqueness". Surely he speaks our own language and looks with us for an ever-expanding awareness of "superindividual Reality". It must be so; but the counsel is to greet him as "fellow-craft" in passing, and leave to whom it concerns (1) his arid study of ways and means by which we approach thereto, through Freudian and post-Freudian schools; (2) his unconvincing curriculum, its divisions and sub-divisions; and more than all perhaps (3) the illustrated diagrams which it is thought may prove helpful. *Non in dialectica complacuit Deo salvum facere populum suum* should be the motto of every metaphysician, according to Professor Whitehead.[‡] It is equally true that we shall not be saved by

* Cf. the pregnant dictum of Saint-Martin concerning "all true men."

[†] *The Hibbert Journal*, Jan. 1934, pp. 184-201.

[‡] *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 380.

charts, by "technical procedure," or any "dramatic conception of our psychological life". Love is the key and Love the only way. So also regarding Miss Dorothy M. Emmet on world-salvation by incarnation of God in the world in the same periodical: she may be asked to remember that the one salvation is of the God, who is born within us, a truth which Professor J. S. Haldane, expresses in other terms when he says: "it is only within ourselves that we find the revelation

of God." Is not its work performed by the Divine Eros of Plato's "Symposium," a part haply of that "play of Divine Love" of which Sir Francis Younghusband speaks?
—*Asiatic Review* (October)

Hereof are a few of many voices, witnessing at the threshold of the Land of Nous. But if there is one that sounds from within, it is Mr. R. G. Shahani who says that "the universe is a training ground for the Sons of God".

A. E. WAITE

UNITY BEHIND SEEMING DIVERSITY

The more we learn of the story of mankind in all its length and breadth the more fully do we realise that we are members of one another. Geographical, racial and linguistic barriers fail to impair the fundamental unity of civilization. . . . The study of comparative religion—one of the triumphs of the critical spirit—is at last enabling us to seize the underlying unit in what William James called the varieties of religious experience.

The above is an extract from the admirable address on "Unity of Civilization" delivered last November before the Ethical Union, London, by its President, Mr. G. P. Gooch. Many of the views expressed therein are but an echo of the teachings imparted by H. P. Blavatsky fifty years ago. She always emphasized in her works the fundamental unity behind all seeming diversities of race, religious creeds, etc., and she unequivocally condemned false nationalism and the conflicting religious creeds in vogue at the moment as formidable barriers

against the practical realization of this unity. During the last few years identical views have been expressed by several leading thinkers in the West, and Mr. Gooch is one more addition to the number.

Why is it that these fine ideals have failed to achieve any tangible results? The answer is furnished in the following words of a great Eastern Teacher to a Westerner in the early days of the Theosophical Movement:—

. . . . the philanthropy you Western thinkers boast of, having no character of universality; *i.e.*, never having been established on the firm footing of a moral, universal principle; never having risen higher than theoretical talk; and that chiefly among the ubiquitous Protestant preachers, it is but a mere accidental manifestation but no recognised LAW. The most superficial analysis will show, that, no more than any other empirical phenomenon in human nature, can it be taken as an absolute standard of moral activity; *i.e.*, one productive of efficient action.

P. J.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE SUFIS AND REINCARNATION

The all too brief pronouncement by Professor R.A. Nicholson in THE ARYAN PATH for January, 1934, on "The Sufis and Reincarnation" must be taken as decisive, coming as it does from such high authority. If, therefore, I pursue the subject further it is not by way of reply or rejoinder, but only because more light is needed by puzzled non-expert inquirers and amateurs like myself.

Professor Nicholson says that "Rumi, like all the great Sufi teachers, unequivocally repudiates the heresy of *tanāsukh*" (reincarnation). One implication of this unqualified statement is that if at all any Sufis have held the doctrine of *tanāsukh* they must have been insignificant persons who have no place in the long line of recognised masters of Sufism. I venture to think that this would be an overstatement; how, I shall proceed to show.

The author of that treasure-house of mystic lore, the *Dabistān*, does not appear to regard *tanāsukh* as a heresy in Sufism. According to him, the "Eastern" school of Sufis, whom he significantly derives from ancient Iranian mystics called "Azar-Hoshangiān" or "Yezdāniān," held definite dogmas about different kinds of reincarnation, such as *nashk* (man being reborn as man again), *maskh* (rebirth as animal), *raskh* (rebirth as vegetable), and *fashk* (rebirth as mineral).^{*} Elsewhere in the same book we find a Sufi master distinguishing between *burūz* ("manifestation" or incarnation of a perfect soul "for the sake of perfecting mankind") and *tanāsukh*, both taking place, according to this authority, "in the fourth month" (after conception).†

Turning to the monumental *Literary History of Persia* by Dr. Nicholson's great teacher, E. G. Browne, and espe-

cially to his luminous chapters on the Manichaeans, Ismailis and other esoteric sectarians, we find that the doctrines of *hulūl* (incarnation of the Perfect Man or the Deity), *rījat* ("return" of the Imam after death), *tanāsukh* (ordinary reincarnation)—all deadly "heresies" according to Islam—were widely prevalent in Persia and other Islamic lands in the early centuries of the Hejira. For instance, the extreme Shiites known as "Ghulāt" (the name of one of their sub-sections, the "Mazdakiyya," is specially worth noting by the way), Carmatnians, Ismailis, Bātinis, Hurūfis, and others held these doctrines of *hulūl*, etc. Coming to the Sufis, we are told that that prince of Sufi "masters," Mansur-i-Hallāj, "certainly held all the cardinal doctrines of the Ghulāt (i.e., the extreme Shiites)—*hulūl*, *rījat* and the like". Of Mansūr's master, the no less celebrated Junayd of Baghdad, we are told that he was "not much more orthodox". And the third shining light of Persian Sufism, Bāyazid of Bistām, held and uttered such fearful "heresies" that poor Rūmi has to make excuses for him in his *Mathnavi*. One of these utterances, as recorded by Browne via 'Attār, was:—"Verily I am God: there is no God but me; therefore worship me." Surely, reincarnation (*tanāsukh*) as a heresy is a mere peccadillo compared to this unpardonable sin against the Deity according to Islam. And let it be emphasised once more that there are no three names held in such reverence and esteem in the Sufi literature of Persia and India as are those of Bāyazid and Junayd and Mansūr. (Browne: Vol. I, p. 310 ff.).

As Browne acutely observes:—

It is noteworthy that both Bāyazid and

Junayd were Persians [and so was Mansūr, too, — a Persian of "Magian" descent], and may very likely have imported into the mysticism which they so ardently embraced ideas long endemic in their country, for it was certainly the Persian Sufis who went to the greatest lengths in developing the pantheistic aspect of Sufism.—Vol. I, p. 428.

How these ideas were "long endemic" in Persia becomes clear when Browne informs us, in another connection, how "the beginnings of Sufi doctrines... may in reality go back beyond the Muhammadan to the Sasanian times" (*Ibid*, p. 68). It would take us too far afield if we were to follow out in detail the fascinating vistas opened up by Browne's pregnant remarks on the possible indebtedness of Neo-Platonism itself—(which is held by scholars, including Dr. Nicholson, to have profoundly influenced Sufism)—to eastern, especially Persian influences. For Plotinus had sojourned in Persia, according to Porphyry, "expressly to study the systems of philosophy there taught." (p. 420) We can only note in passing that the teachings of Māni in the third century of the Christian era, and of Mazdak in the sixth,—both avowedly influenced by Buddhism,—seem to have taken root in Persia though outwardly the heresies were wiped out by ruthless state persecution. Darmesteter, again, held that early Sasanian Zoroastrianism was influenced by the Logos philosophy of Philo Judaeus,—who, also, believed in metempsychosis, as did the later Neo-Platonists. Whether we believe in this theory, or hold with Mills that on the contrary it was Zoroastrianism that markedly influenced Philo, the point to note is that the belief in metempsychosis was "long endemic" in Persia before Islamic Sufism came on the field.

Reverting to Rūmi himself, we find that the profoundest, the most disturbing, spiritual experience of his life was the intercourse with his wild and eccentric "master" in Sufism, Shamsuddin of Tabriz, who claimed to be at least the

* "Man Shams-i-Tabrizi nayam, man Nūr-i-Pākam ay pisar."

† Unfortunately I have not Dr. Nicholson's edition of the original before me. The text before me (Lucknow, 1874) reads: "Bayān-i-atwār-i-Khilqat-i-Ādami dar fitrat," i.e., "Description of the (diverse) ways of the creation of Man in nature."

equal of the Prophet of Islam, and of whom Rūmi himself has said in a Ghazal, "Shams-i-Tabriz Muhammad bud o ham būd Ali (i.e., Shams-i-Tabriz was Muhammad and also Ali)—and has plainly hinted elsewhere that he was even more, i.e., "Nūr-i-pāk," the Holy Light.*

It is noteworthy that this strange man's father was, according to the account given by Dr. Nicholson, an Ismaili, though later in life he is said to have renounced Ismailism. How profoundly this man influenced Jalaluddin Rūmi, is best described in Dr. Nicholson's own words:—

He [Rūmi] renounced his [own] teaching, and retired with Shams to solitary and desert places where in close communion they discussed the deepest arcana of mystical philosophy. [*Introduction to the Divān-i-Shams-i-Tabriz*, p. xxiii.]

So much for the spiritual background of the *Mathnavi* and the *Divān* from which we have considered the two passages disposed of by Dr. Nicholson in his brief note. I beg to submit for his consideration another remarkable passage from the Fourth Book of the *Mathnavi*; and I quote it from his own translation at some length:—

The man who lives in a city (many) years, as soon as his eye goes asleep, beholds another city full of good and evil, and his own city comes not into his memory at all. . . Nay, he thinks that in sooth he has always lived in this very city and has been born and bred in it. What wonder then if the spirit does not remember its (ancient) abodes which have been its dwelling place and birthplace aforesome, since this world, like sleep, is covering it over as clouds cover the stars? Especially as it has trodden so many cities and the dust has not (yet) been swept from its perceptive faculty, nor has it made ardent efforts that its heart should become pure and behold the past. . . .

After this preamble comes the section headed "The Diverse Modes and Stages of the Nature of Man from the Beginning," † which runs:—

First he came into the clime (world) of inorganic things, and from the state of inorganic

* *Dabistan*, by Shea and Troyer, Vol. III, pp. 149-150.

† *Ibid*, pp. 277-278.

things he passed into the vegetable state. Many years he lived in the vegetable state and did not remember the inorganic state because of the opposition (between them); and when he passed from the vegetable into the animal state, the vegetable state was not remembered by him at all.... Again the Creator, whom thou knowest, was leading him (man) from the animal (state) towards humanity. Thus did he advance from clime to clime (from one world of being to another), till he has now become intelligent and wise and mighty. He hath no remembrance of his former intelligences (souls); from this (human) intelligence also there is a migration to be made by him, that he may escape from this intelligence full of greed and self-seeking and may behold a hundred thousand intelligences most marvelous. — [Nicholson's *Mathnawi*, Vol. IV, pp. 471-472.]

Whinfield, who gives this passage at p. 216 of his work on the *Mathnawi*, adds in a footnote, "This doctrine is not transmigration of soul (*tanasukh*), but evolution of soul based on Aristotle's 'De Anima'." It may be "evolution"; but it comes "in such a questionable shape" that one cannot help asking: "What is it that evolves, and how does it do so?" It is not necessary to cross the "t's" and dot the "i's" in this passage from the *Mathnawi* quoted above to see that the doctrine inculcated in it looks perilously like progressive reincarnation; and it is, so far as I can judge, difficult to square with the teaching of Aristotle, who, in his "De Anima," is said by an authority on the subject to have defined the soul as "the entelechy of a natural body capable of life" and thus completely rejected "any attempt to make the soul a thing or an entity". If I may be allowed to venture a guess on a subject of which, I must confess, I know very little, perhaps the contact with Aristotle's "De Anima" that the early Sufis had was not direct but through the refracting medium of Neo-Platonism; for instance, Plutarch of Athens, who was a teacher of Proclus, "the chief representative of the later Neo-Platonists," and himself a devout Neo-Platonist, is known to have written a commentary on "De Anima" which is regarded as "the most important contribution to Aristotelian literature since the time of Alexander of

Aphrodisias".

It is undoubtedly true that Rūmi was a strictly brought up son of a strict Sunni religious teacher and himself occupied his father's "chair" after the latter's death. But late in life came the unsettling unorthodox influence of the Sufi "master" whom he repeatedly gives in his Ghazals honours that are rank blasphemy and deadly heresy in the eyes of any orthodox Sunni Muslim. Dr. Nicholson has recorded how Rūmi's own disciples bitterly resented Shamsuddin's esoteric teaching as "an insidious attempt to seduce their beloved Master"—so bitterly and fiercely that, according to one account, Shams was entrapped and done to death by seven of them, including one of Rūmi's own sons! If, as we are told, Rūmi retired with Shamsuddin to desert places, "where in close communion they discussed the deepest arcana of mystical philosophy," would it be too extravagant to surmise that one of the mysteries so discussed was the "long endemic" doctrine of progressive transmigration of the soul? And would it be quite unthinkable that in the passage discussed above, as in the other two, Shamsuddin's "heretical" mysticism has temporarily taken full control of Rūmi's orthodox pen? For, immediately after this passage the poet reverts to orthodoxy, and decrees for the miserable erring human soul grim tribulations after death *till the crack of doom*. Surely, more light is needed to illustrate these passages so as to show clearly what it is that evolves under the "evolution" theory, and, if it be the individual soul, what is the process by which it "evolves" from the mineral to a superhuman and even divine state without going through a series of rebirths.

Bombay.

J. S.

P. S. After I had written the above I happened to read Dr. Nicholson's own confirmation of my conjecture about the Neo-Platonist source of the Sufis' contact with Aristotle. In his

translation of Sir Muhammad Iqbāl's Persian poem, "Asrār-i-Khudi," Dr. Nicholson says in a note (on Iqbāl's assertion that Plato's thought "has deeply influenced the mysticism and literature of Islam"):

When the Moslems began to study Greek philosophy, they turned to Aristotle. The genuine writings of Aristotle, however, were not accessible to them. They studied translations of books passing under his name, which

were the work of Neo-Platonists, so that what they believed to be Aristotelian doctrine was in fact the philosophy of Plotinus, Proclus, and the later Neo-Platonic school. (The Secrets of the Self, p. 56)

I am naturally very pleased to find that what I had advanced as a mere conjecture has the support of Dr. Nicholson's own considered opinion, as the words italicised above clearly show.

J. S.

THE ANTIQUITY OF "MODERN" MAN

The discoveries of Dr. L. B. S. Leakey at the Kabirondo gulf of Lake Victoria Nyanza in Kenya have lately startled orthodox anthropologists, and woken them up to the poverty of their ideas regarding the antiquity of man. At a meeting at the Anthropological Institute in London last October he gave a final report on the jaw fragment, two skull fragments, and animal remains which were unearthed on two sites, Kanam and Kanjera, three miles apart. Eminent scientists such as Professor G. Elliot-Smith and Sir Arthur Smith Woodward were present, and agreed that in no important detail did these human remains differ from those of modern man. Yet the antiquity of these fragments, "modern" though they are, is somewhere in the region of a million years old. The conception of man in that remote period as an "ape-like" creature, with receding forehead, semi-canine teeth and small brain capacity, is proved a myth. Or rather the existence in the distant past of highly developed races in many parts of the world—England, Palestine, Africa, and India—is shown to have been a fact, even if alongside them there were also undeveloped or sub-normal types.

To realise that one has been "out" by a matter of a million years in one's notion of the antiquity of "modern"

man must be a humiliating thought for a scientist. These discoveries of Dr. Leakey will naturally give satisfaction to all who have maintained that man has a far earlier history than was allowed generally up to a quarter of a century ago. To students of Esoteric Philosophy in particular the new finds will be felt to confirm the predictions made in *The Secret Doctrine* in 1888:

... it is not impossible—nay, it is most likely—that further discoveries in geology and the finding of fossil remains of man will force science to confess that it is esoteric philosophy which is right after all, or, at any rate, nearer to the truth. (II, 711)

And the way is pointed to yet another prediction which, if confirmed, would astound the scientists yet more:

... civilization dates still further back than the Miocene Atlanteans. "Secondary-period" man will be discovered, and with him his long forgotten civilization. (II, 266)

As Mr. J. Reid Moir, himself an archaeologist who has contributed important evidence on the early antiquity of man, put it in a letter to *The Times* last October, "the past history of the human race is unfolding itself in a truly majestic manner". He adds that its beginnings are still hid in the mists of remote antiquity—as to which a study of the occult sciences might enlighten him yet further.

London.

G. W. WHITEMAN

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"*ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers.*"

HUDIBRAS.

"Other people's views of life must be learnt and understood," said Professor H. J. Fleure of Manchester University recently in addressing the annual meeting of the School Journey Association. But in order to do this "we must be able to look at ourselves from the outside"—and how few there are who can do so! Most men and women take their ideas *and* prejudices at second hand. As a result, we get the phenomena of mass emotion and mass mind. Ready-made feelings and thoughts are adopted by the generality of mankind—it saves trouble! The problems arising from the mass mind were discussed at the meeting of the Society for Research in Education, held at University College, London, in the beginning of the year. Mr. J. Howard Whitehouse, Warden of Bembridge, Isle of Wight, said:—

The mass mind has suddenly become a world problem. There is an amazing nationalist revival in almost every country, and we see a renewed belief in war and a renewed struggle in the competition for armaments which is really based on fear.

He instanced the case of Germany as a dreadful example of the power of the mass mind and cited a Christmas message from the Nazi Bishop in Germany. This prelate "in announcing that the message of Christmas was peace and good will among men, was careful to

point out that of course peace did not mean that there was to be an end of war." But the Nazi Bishop's "message" need not have so shocked Mr. Whitehouse, for there are many other people in the world who believe in peace only at their own price. The German Bishop would have doubtless lost his job had he spoken otherwise than he did. To what extent is Mr. Whitehouse himself caught in the toils of the anti-Nazi mass thought?

There is only one way by which people will learn to think for themselves, and that is by shaking off the shackles of priestly domination. Such domination is not confined to religion. If we do as the church priest says and think as he thinks, we are safe in the next world; if we do as the political priest says, we are prosperous in this one! There are priests of education who decide what we shall or shall not learn, and turn out robots of culture. There are priests of science who hypnotise us with their dogmas. There are priests of medicine who take charge of our physical health—it is true we may die under a "successful" operation, but no matter; it is only the body which dies! Under other priestly domination, however, our souls may be wounded unto death. All such priests are in reality traitors

to their respective professions. The important thing for such exploiters of humanity is that people should *not* think for themselves.

Only comparatively few persons have the courage to speak out and protest, but they are a growing number. To these the pages of THE ARYAN PATH are always open, for they are the salt of the earth.

Few will contest Mr. Whitehouse's statement that there has been a renewed belief in war and a renewed struggle in the competition for armaments which is really based on fear. But how is that fear engendered? An answer is provided in two remarkable pamphlets which have recently been published by the Union of Democratic Control, London—*Patriotism Ltd: An Exposure of the War Machine* and *The Secret International: Armament Firms at Work*. These may be described as a very detailed and exhaustive amplification of Lord Cecil's statement:—

There is a very sinister feature to all the disarmament discussions. I refer to the tremendous power wielded against all the proposals by armament firms. . . . It is no longer safe to keep in private hands the construction of these terrible instruments of death. We must aim at getting rid of this immense instrument in the maintenance of suspicion.

Mr. H. G. Wells, in characterizing the science of warfare as "a very active occupation," says:—

It is a sort of ugly and dwarfish twin sister of scientific research. The difference is that she tries to be secretive and her ends are murderous. She is perpetually seeking to seize and per-

vert scientific advances.

"Patriotism Ltd" is the name sarcastically given by the publishers to the collective body of the arms traffickers of the world who were charged by a League of Nations Commission in 1921 with playing on national animosities and fomenting war for their own profit; with bribing Government officials; with spreading false stories; with subsidizing newspapers to stimulate arms expenditure. A mass of the most weighty and conclusive evidence to show that these charges still remain true is collected in both the above mentioned pamphlets; they reveal in a telling manner some of the darkest aspects of the after-war world made safe for Democracy. "Profits have no fatherland. War, for Patriotism Ltd, is good business"—this is the grim conclusion of these pamphlets. As shareholders in such nefarious business all sorts of people make money but "oddly enough there is a noticeably high proportion of clergymen"! (*The Secret International*, p. 43.)

Though in most countries organized religions are weakening, in some outlying parts of the world creedal fanaticism flourishes; here is an instance. It seems that the Inquisition has returned, for the saving of souls by the whip is undertaken in the north-eastern part of the South American republic of Colombia. Here, in comparatively isolated villages, the Capuchins, a religious order of Saint Francis, are said to impose orthodox Catho-